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In December 2021, the World Health Assembly (“WHA”) convened to develop a pandemic
response treaty for future pandemics. Unfortunately, as presently envisioned, the resulting
pandemic response framework will suffer from many of the same inadequacies that prevented
existing frameworks from responding effectively to COVID-19. The threat of new pandemics
emerging in the future—and new variants developing in the present—call for a more integrated,
robust, comprehensive solution.
This Article lays a blueprint for that solution: a global multilateral Council empowered to (1)
investigate developing pandemics; (2) incentivize pharmaceutical companies to rapidly produce
vaccines and share them through voluntary licenses or TRIPS compulsory licensing provisions; (3)
facilitate the rapid creation of raw material pipelines to vaccine and treatment developers; and
(4) resolve related legal disputes to ensure a rapid and coordinated response to emerging diseases
and variants.

I. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................3
II. BACKGROUND .........................................................................................5
A. Conflicts of Interest ....................................................................5
1. Public Health Organizations vs. Pharmaceutical
Companies ............................................................................6
a. Geographic and Temporal Inequities ..........................7
J.D. Candidate, Texas A&M University School of Law, May 2022. The author has
a bachelor’s degree in Industrial Engineering from the University of Miami. He
wishes to thank Professors Peter Yu, Saurabh Vishnubhakat and Srividhya Ragavan
for their support and guidance on this paper. He also wishes to thank Dean Ahdieh
and the faculty of the Texas A&M University School of Law. Finally, he would like
to thank his family for their support.
+
J.D. Candidate, Columbia Law School, May 2022. He would like to thank Professor
George Bermann, B. Joseph Wadsworth, and Brooke Damico for their
encouragement and support.
*

2022

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

10:2

b. Deadlocked Incentives ..................................................9
2. Nation vs. Nation .............................................................. 10
a. Vaccine Nationalism .................................................... 10
b. Resource Sharing ......................................................... 13
III. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE: EXISTING FRAMEWORKS ................ 14
A. Existing Vaccine Sharing Frameworks ................................. 16
1. COVAX (Gavi) .................................................................. 16
2. International COVID-IP Pledge ..................................... 17
3. International Drug Purchase Facility .............................. 19
B. Collaborative Projects .............................................................. 21
1. Trilateral Cooperation Agreement for the COVID19 Pandemic ...................................................................... 21
2. Pandemic Flu Preparedness Framework ........................ 23
3. Multilateral COVID-19 Task Force ................................ 25
C. Drawbacks of the Current Frameworks and Projects ........ 26
1. Lack of Funding ................................................................. 26
2. Lack of Incentive for Rights-Holders to License IP .... 29
IV. PROPOSED BLUEPRINT FOR A MULTILATERAL PANDEMIC
RESPONSE COUNCIL ...................................................................... 29
A. Participating Entities ................................................................ 31
1. Responsibilities of Each IGO .......................................... 31
B. Scope of Charter ....................................................................... 36
1. Investigative Capabilities................................................... 37
2. Voluntary and Non-Voluntary Licensing
Capabilities ........................................................................ 42
a. Voluntary Licensing ..................................................... 42
b. Non-Voluntary Licensing........................................... 43
1. The Last Resort License ................................................... 46
3. Ability to Establish Rapid-Response Raw Material
Pipelines ............................................................................. 47
4. Dispute Resolution ............................................................ 50
C. Proposed Funding Model for Initiatives through Taxes .... 52
D. Risks and Concerns ................................................................. 54
V. CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 56

2

2022

The Post-Pandemic Order

10:2

I. INTRODUCTION
“[Y]ou can’t go home again,” wrote American novelist Thomas
Wolfe. “You can’t go . . . home to the old forms and systems of things
which once seemed everlasting, but which are changing all the time—
back home to the escapes of Time and Memory.”1 Wolfe was writing
in the 1930s, but his thesis is applicable today. Some events are so
significant that, once they have passed, there is no going back to the
way things were.
In the first months of the coronavirus (“COVID-19”)
pandemic, the chief motivation for following public health advice was
to promote an end to lockdown and a swift return to “normal.”2 Later,
as the pandemic dragged on, pundits began cautiously discussing a
“new normal”: the world was never going to go quite back to the way
it was before.3 Subsequent events have shown these pundits to be
prophetic. Despite the remarkable speed and success of the vaccine,4
COVID-19 and its consequences remain a fact of everyday life. The
pandemic is an ongoing watershed that will leave no industry or
community unchanged. Rather than trying to claw back the way things
were, business leaders, lawmakers, and academics must turn their
attention to what the future should be. The next great human project
will be constructing the new normal.
Like so many others in the pandemic’s early days, health
organizations and pharmaceutical companies have been guilty of
overreliance on pre-pandemic frameworks. These frameworks were
imperfect under ideal scenarios and totally inadequate to the pressures
and demands of the present hour. After decades of zero-sum thinking
THOMAS WOLFE, YOU CAN’T GO HOME AGAIN 602 (1941).
Early pandemic measured were explained in terms of weathering an initial
wave of infection, with the promise of more relaxed measures and lower risks on the
other side. See Siobhan Roberts, Flattening the Coronavirus Curve, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html.
3
Lisa Maragakis, The New Normal and Coronavirus, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., 2
(Jun.
14,
2020),
https://www.johnshopkinssolutions.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/Johns-Hopkins_COVID_NewNormal_V061620.pdf.
4
Smriti Mallapaty, Ewen Callaway, et al., How COVID Vaccines Shaped
2021—in Eight Powerful Charts, 600 NATURE 580–81 (2021).
1
2
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and unhappy compromises, the present watershed is a rare opportunity
for intellectual property (“IP”) holders and public health organizations
to come to the table and broker a more equitable, sustainable
mediation of rights.5
This Article briefly surveys the history of conflict between
pharmaceutical patent holders and public health organizations before
evaluating previous efforts to balance their competing interests.
Existing vaccine sharing frameworks like the COVID-19 Vaccines
Access (“COVAX”), the International Drug Purchase Facility, and the
various COVID IP pledges that have been announced all suffer from
the same problems: they are expensive, underfunded, and inflexible.
When they do not compel rights-holders to license their IP, they fail
to provide adequate incentives to coax voluntary licensing. Furtherreaching collaborative projects are presently underway with greater
potential to provide lasting solutions. These projects include the
Trilateral Cooperation Agreement for the Current Pandemic, the
Trilateral Flu Preparedness Framework, and the Multilateral Leader’s
Task Force on COVID-19. While promising, these collaborative
projects suffer from many of the same problems as the existing
frameworks. They are not ambitious enough to provide meaningful
change.
Building on the successes and failures of these previous efforts,
this Article proposes a more durable solution: a blueprint for a
Multilateral Council on Pandemic Response jointly chaired by the
World Health Organization (“WHO”), World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”), World Trade Organization (“WTO”),
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), and World Bank. This Council
would be empowered to investigate the origins and movements of
dangerous diseases, equitably broker both voluntary and compulsory
IP licenses, rapidly distribute raw materials around the globe to
facilitate vaccine production, and resolve disputes that might hinder a
unified response. By tapping five respected international organizations,
empowering them to respond meaningfully to health crises, and
ensuring representation for the interests of each key stakeholder, this
For a general discussion of rights mediation, see JAMAL GREENE, HOW
RIGHTS WENT WRONG xvii–xxi, (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2021).
5

4
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blueprint offers what previous attempts have failed to achieve: an
ambitious, equitable, sustainable international framework for
responding to disease outbreaks. If adopted, the blueprint could ensure
that vaccines and raw materials are as readily available in the global
south as they are in the north. It could provide a useful check against
vaccine nationalism. It could find synergies between public health
needs and corporate economic necessities, allowing nations to protect
their citizens without stifling pharmaceutical companies’ profit
incentives. Most importantly, it could provide a comprehensive
solution that solves more than just the narrow IP licensing dilemma. It
would address future viruses and variants at every stage, preventing
and tracking outbreaks while also facilitating vaccine development,
licensing, manufacturing, and distribution.
In the wake of COVID-19, bobbing with the flotsam and
jetsam of the old order, governments and patent holders cannot go
home again. The rapid development and spread of new viral variants
mean that stop-gap measures or narrow efforts that try to preserve the
spirit of the old status quo will likewise be inadequate. Fortunately, the
construction of a new order is already underway. The post-pandemic
order promises to be more equitable, more effective, and more
sustainable than what came before.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Conflicts of Interest
The old order is the product of decades of negotiated solutions
between parties with conflicting interests. These conflicts exist at
multiple levels and run in different directions. They pit pharmaceutical
companies against public health organizations, northern nations
against southern ones, wealthy nations against poor ones, and even
wealthy nations against each other. To understand the foundation
upon which the new order must be built, one must appreciate the
complex conflicts of interest around which previous solutions have
been negotiated.

5
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1. Public Health Organizations vs. Pharmaceutical Companies
Public health agencies and pharmaceutical companies have
been at odds over IP licensing for decades. Drugs are risky and
expensive to develop.6 Virtually all require a large initial outlay, but
relatively few succeed in securing the necessary approvals to reach the
market.7 Of those that secure approval, only some become commercial
successes.8 Because research and development (“R&D”) expenses are
so high, pharmaceutical companies operate on a “race to patent”
model.9 When the market calls for a pharmaceutical solution, drug
companies start gambling, investing vast amounts of time and money
into R&D in hopes of solving the problem first, patenting their
solution, and then resting secure in the knowledge that their patent will
be a source of income for years, restoring their R&D investment and
eventually returning a hefty profit.10 The steep cost of R&D is how
See Olivier J. Woulters et al., Estimated Research and Development Investment
Needed to Bring a New Medicine to Market, 2009-2018, 323 JAMA 844 (2020); but see
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Big Pharma’s Go-To Defense of Soaring Drug Prices Doesn’t Add Up,
THE
ATL.
(Mar.
23,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/03/drug-prices-high-costresearch-and-development/585253/ [hereinafter Emanuel].
7
Conor Hale, New MIT Study Puts Clinical Research Success Rate at 14 Percent,
CENTERWATCH (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.centerwatch.com/articles/12702-newmit-study-puts-clinical-research-success-rate-at-14percent#:~:text=Nearly%2014%20percent%20of%20all,MIT%20Sloan%20School
%20of%20Management.
8 See Derek Lowe, Only Two Out of Ten Drugs? Really?, SCIENCE.ORG (Mar. 30,
2016), https://www.science.org/content/blog-post/only-two-out-ten-drugs-really
(evaluating the common claim that “only two of every ten drugs on the market ever
earn back enough money to match the costs of R&D and the FDA approval process
before the patent expires.” BIOTECH. INNOVATION ORG., UNLEASHING THE NEXT
GENERATION
OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY
INNOVATION
3
(2015),
https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/legacy/bioorg/docs/WhitepaperFinal.pdf).
9
Ana Santos Rutschman, The COVID-19 Vaccine Race: Intellectual Property,
Collaboration(s), Nationalism and Misinformation, 64 WASH. UNIV. J. L POLICY 167, 173
(2021),
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2187&context=law
_journal_law_policy.
10 See generally Kiu Tay-Teo et al., Comparison of Sales Income and Research and
Development Costs for FDA-Approved Cancer Drugs Sold by Originator Companies, JAMA
(2019), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2720075
6

6
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drug companies justify the high prices of their products and the vigor
with which they protect their intellectual property.11 According to drug
manufacturers, patents—and the steep prices their monopolies
command—are required to fund the research and development of new
vaccines and remedies.12 No patents, the reasoning goes, no lifesaving
drugs.13
This focus on profits may be an economic necessity, but it
creates problems for public health. Pharmaceutical companies’
incentive to research a disease is proportional to the amount people
can pay for a vaccine or cure. This profit incentive creates a disconnect
between the diseases that affect the most people globally and the
diseases that enjoy the greatest R&D investment.14 The effects of this
disconnect are felt both geographically and temporally.
a. Geographic and Temporal Inequities
Geographically, the afflictions of wealthy nations receive the
bulk of R&D spending, while diseases common in poorer countries
receive little investment.15 This is true both of therapeutic drugs for
treating diseases and vaccines for preventing them.16 Temporally,
research often lags far behind the spread of emerging diseases,
particularly when those diseases emerge in the global south.17 Ebola,
Zika, and previous coronaviruses like MERS and SARS were not the
subjects of sustained research attention until they had already reached
a boiling point in their countries of origin and spilled over into Europe
(finding that most cancer drugs that secure FDA approval generate significant profits
over time).
11 Emanuel, supra note 6.
12 Id.
13 See Rutschman, supra note 9 (“[T]he possibility of obtaining a patent
serves, at least nominally, as an incentive to investment in R&D projects deemed
especially risky, costly and time-consuming. According to this often-cited strand of
intellectual property discourse, one of the primary roles of the patent system is thus
to provide incentives to overall risky R&D, of which pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical are often listed as classical examples.” Id.).
14 See Rutschman, supra note 9, at 170–71.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 169.
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or the United States.18 Because pharmaceutical companies are loath to
invest their resources into developing diseases that may or may not
become serious enough to generate a lucrative market, they tend to
wait until a definite market exists before committing to R&D.19 As a
consequence, a disease may have run halfway around the world before
pharmaceutical R&D ever crosses the starting line. By the time a
disease has affected enough people to create a promising market for a
pharmaceutical solution, it has often already spread extensively and
affected many thousands of people.20 The profit-driven race-to-patent
model is fundamentally reactive. Rather than patrolling the
neighborhood and looking for suspicious activity, it responds only
once the alarm has been pulled—and then only when enough damage
has already occurred to make it worth an expensive trip.
The real race begins once a clear market has developed and
multiple pharmaceutical companies begin R&D at once.21 It may take
months or even years, but eventually a “winner” will emerge with a
viable pharmaceutical solution—either a drug to treat the disease or a
vaccine to prevent its spread—and immediately patent it. The patent
will ensure that nobody else is able to profit from the solution or use
it without permission. It also means that the patent-holder can charge
a premium for the medicine or vaccine, in many cases placing it beyond
the reach of the poorer countries where the disease emerged in the first
place. This has the unhappy effect of leaving poorer countries
unprotected both before and after emerging diseases receive R&D
attention: no preventative solution exists to slow the disease in its early
stages, and by the time a solution has arrived it costs too much to be
readily available to its first victims. In some cases, the governments of
Id.
See Helen Branswell, Big Pharmaceutical Companies Reluctant to Produce Zika
Vaccine, PBS (Aug. 9, 2016, 12:33 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/bigpharmaceutical-companies-reluctant-produce-zika-vaccine (“For now, vaccine
development seems like a risky venture for manufacturers that have recently taken
part in a string of emerging diseases rodeos, from SARS and Ebola to the West Nile
virus and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Those efforts have required significant
investments on the part of major pharmaceutical companies, and have yielded either
modest or no financial return.”).
20 See Rutschman, supra note 9, at 170–71 (describing the problem in terms
of the Ebola outbreak).
21 Id. at 173 (discussing the features of the “race to patent” business model).
18
19

8

2022

The Post-Pandemic Order

10:2

wealthy countries partner with pharmaceutical companies to fund
research and development, but once a product emerges, the
subsequent patent keeps it in the hands of the funding state,
inaccessible to other countries who need it.22 The system effectively
leapfrogs the countries where emerging diseases are most common.
b. Deadlocked Incentives
It is no wonder that pharmaceutical companies struggle to find
common ground with public health organizations. One is driven by
profit, even if it means falling out of alignment with public health
needs. The other is driven by the public interest, even if it comes at the
expense of private-sector profits. Yet both groups need each other.
Public health organizations, despite usually being branches of state
governments, often lack the resources to perform major R&D work
on their own.23 They rely on the research and products of
pharmaceutical companies, but that research does not necessarily track
public health needs, and those products are locked away behind
patents. On the other hand, pharmaceutical companies cannot protect
their IP on their own. They rely on governments to grant and maintain
the patents that allow them to profit on their research.
Patents, while powerful, are not absolute. Virtually all national
governments have legal provisions that force IP holders to license their
work to others if certain conditions are met.24 These non-voluntary, or
compulsory, licenses are a powerful tool in the arsenal of health
organizations, constituting a trump card that allows governments to
distribute patented pharmaceuticals however they choose, regardless
of the IP rights-holder’s wishes, if the situation becomes sufficiently
dire.25 On the one hand, if pharmaceutical companies price lifesaving
Harris Meyer, After a COVID-19 Vaccine: Collaboration or Competition?, 39
HEALTH AFF. 1856, 1857 (2020) (“The COVAX initiative grew out of the world’s
experience in dealing with the H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009, when the US
delayed for months in sharing with less wealthy nations the vaccine it had developed
to combat that virus.”).
23 See Branswell, supra note 19.
24
For an overview of voluntary and compulsory licensing schemes, see Arjun
Padmanabhan, Coronavirus, Compulsory Licensing, and Collaboration: Analyzing the 2020
Global Vaccine Response with 20/20 Hindsight, 30 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 75, 87–88.
25 Id.
22
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products unreasonably and reap profits too gratuitously during a health
crisis, the national government may intervene and force them to issue
licenses. If, on the other hand, government health agencies rely on
compulsory licenses too often, they risk killing the golden goose: with
profit incentives impaired, pharmaceutical companies might stop
producing the drugs and research that fuel public health efforts.
Accordingly, governments rarely exercise their compulsory licensing
schemes, choosing to try to coax pharmaceutical companies into
issuing voluntary licenses instead.26
Unlike compulsory licenses, which are a product of legislation,
voluntary licenses are essentially a contract between the pharmaceutical
company and the licensee.27 Because pharmaceutical companies are
free to determine the terms of voluntary licenses, these licenses are
often limited in scope and require the payment of hefty royalties.28
With the leverage balanced so evenly between them, pharmaceutical
companies and health organizations have spent decades walking a
razor’s edge, locked in a tense codependent relationship despite their
apparently irreconcilable interests.29
2. Nation vs. Nation
a. Vaccine Nationalism
While COVID-19 is a pandemic in the truest sense—its effects
are felt worldwide—national governments have struggled to address it
as a global issue or shed state-centric attitudes. In the same way that
pharmaceutical companies think first about the interests of their
shareholders, national governments tend to think first about the
interests of their citizens. History has shown them to be hesitant to
invest national funds into international enterprises, even when they
might yield significant benefits for citizens. Accordingly, when a nation

26 Id. at 91–93 (discussing U.S. attempts to use march-in rights against
pharmaceutical patent holders during pandemics).
27 Id.
28 See id. at 87.
29 Id. at 91–93 (discussing U.S. attempts to use march-in rights against
pharmaceutical patent holders during pandemics).
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invests in a vaccine, it tends not to share it across borders.30 Despite
initial good intentions—the presidents of both France and China made
speeches arguing that COVID-19 vaccines should be treated as “global
public goods” and made universally available regardless of their
origin31—the COVID-19 vaccines have been no exception to this
rule.32
At the outset of the pandemic, wary of the aforementioned
temporal problem, wealthy governments created a lucrative market for
COVID-19 R&D by setting aside billions of dollars to fund and buy
vaccines.33 Spurred into action by the promise of tremendous profits,
pharmaceutical companies raced potential vaccines through clinical
trials while simultaneously engaging would-be buyers in bidding wars
over potential doses. In these bidding wars, the same wealthy countries
that put up the initial R&D money unsurprisingly came away
victorious, locking up most doses before they were even on the
market.34 The U.S. COVID-19 initiative, ambitiously called
“Operation Warp Speed,” involved brokering deals with dozens of
pharmaceutical companies, offering to contribute money toward
research on the condition that the resulting vaccines be made available
first to U.S. citizens.35 Other countries followed suit. By November
2020, as the race for a vaccine built toward a climax, the United States,
UK, EU, and Japan had agreed to buy more than 300 billion doses
between them, and there was little hope that China and India would
share the results of their research programs with other nations.36 For

30
Thomas J. Bollyky & Chad P. Bown, The Tragedy of Vaccine Nationalism:
Only Cooperation Can End the Pandemic, 99 FOREIGN AFFS. 96, 96–97 (2020).
31
Anna Marie Merlo, Macron to WHO: ‘The Vaccine is a Global Public Good’, IL
MANIFESTO (May 20, 2020), https://global.ilmanifesto.it/macron-to-who-thevaccine-is-a-global-public-good/; Corinne Gretler, Xi Vows China Will Share Vaccine
and Gives WHO Full Backing, BLOOMBERG (May 18, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-18/china-s-virus-vaccinewill-be-global-public-good-xi-says.
32 See generally Meyer, supra note 22.
33 Id. at 1857.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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poorer countries, vaccines were effectively sold out before they ever
even hit the shelves.37
As the vaccines neared completion, inter-state competition
became even more apparent. In May 2020, Sanofi, a major French
pharmaceutical company, announced that it was going to give most of
its initial doses to the United States.38 The United States, it reasoned,
had contributed the largest amount of funding and so it deserved the
lion’s share of the early doses.39 France, outraged that a domestic
company would send vital products overseas in a time of crisis,
condemned the decision in the strongest terms.40 President Macron,
mindful of the tax exemptions his government granted Sanofi,
summoned its leadership to a meeting at the Élysée Palace to remind
them of the fact.41 Sanofi reversed course shortly thereafter and
promised to share its vaccines more generously with its domestic
benefactor.42 France had been previously criticized by its European
neighbors for not sharing its supply of protective medical equipment
when they needed it.43
It makes sense that nations would look after their own in a time
of crisis. Government leaders’ duty to their own people is clear and
stark; their duty to the world, or to the citizens of foreign nations, is

Id.
James Patton et al., U.S. Likely to Get Sanofi Vaccine First if It Succeeds,
BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202005-13/u-s-to-get-sanofi-covid-vaccine-first-if-it-succeeds-ceo-says.
39 See id.
40
James McAuley, France Angered by Suggestion U.S. Would Get First Access to
Coronavirus Vaccine by French Pharma Company Sanofi, WASH. POST (May 14, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/coronavirus-vaccinesanofi/2020/05/14/821c7c12-95e2-11ea-87a3-22d324235636_story.html.
41 See Eleanor Beardsley, French Drug Giant Sanofi Takes Heat After Suggesting
U.S.
May
Get
1st
Vaccine
Access,
NPR
(May
15,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/05/15/856293764/french-drug-giant-sanofi-takesheat-after-suggesting-u-s-may-get-1st-vaccine-acc.
42
Noemie Bisserbe, Sanofi Bows to France’s Demand for Coronavirus Vaccine
Supplies, WALL STREET J. (Jun. 16, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sanofibows-to-frances-demand-for-coronavirus-vaccine-supplies-11592322940.
43 See Beardsley, supra note 41.
37
38
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much murkier.44 Self-preservation is an inward-facing instinct, leading
people to put their own interests ahead of others when the stakes are
high. However, a pandemic is a perfect example of a situation where
nations’ instinct for self-preservation works against them. In a closelyconnected world where national economies rely on foreign markets,
there can be no isolated escape from the consequences of COVID19—no victory at another nation’s expense.45 Countries will either
defeat the virus together, or not at all.46
b. Resource Sharing
Even in a universe where pharmaceutical companies were
willing to share their patents for drugs and vaccines freely, there would
still be a hurdle in the way for poorer countries. A patent is simply a
blueprint and turning a blueprint into a real-life product requires
material resources. Countries that are unable to afford licenses for
patents are unlikely to have the resources or expertise required to turn
blueprints into safe and effective vaccines or therapeutic drugs. This
issue has been particularly prevalent in countries like India that have
manufacturing capacity but lack easy access to the arcane and
expensive materials required to manufacture vaccines.47 This problem
is made more acute by embargoes: when large, wealthy nations levy
embargoes against poorer ones, it becomes very difficult for those
countries to get access to the materials they need to vaccinate their
populations.48
In some dramatic circumstances, states that otherwise enjoy
good diplomatic relations have made it illegal to share vaccines or
materials between themselves.49 Italy blocked a shipment of
AstraZeneca vaccine to Australia in March 2021, throwing the

44
Sarah Joseph & Gregory Dore, Vaccine Apartheid? A Human Rights Analysis
of COVID-19 Vaccine Inequity, SSRN, 1, 11 (Jun. 30, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3876848.
45 See Meyer, supra note 22, at 1857.
46 See id. (quoting GAVI CEO Seth Berkley, “With infectious disease, no one
is safe until everyone is safe.”)
47 See Joseph & Dore, supra note 44, at 12.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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Australian pandemic response into disarray.50 When India needed
certain resources to produce vaccines later that year, it asked the
United States for help, only to have its request flatly denied.51 Both
Italy and the United States justified their decisions to obstruct the flow
of vaccine ingredients to other countries by arguing that their own
need was objectively greater than that of the other state.52
The problem of resource-sourcing is one that has been largely
overlooked in the current vaccine licensing discourse, perhaps because
it is not a prima facie IP issue. However, just like funding, R&D, and
distribution, it is a critical part of the vaccine life-cycle,53 and one that
cannot be overlooked without consequence. Granting a vaccine license
to a country that lacks access to the materials necessary to produce it
is like giving a key without a car or a password without a computer—
a largely empty gesture.
III. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE: EXISTING FRAMEWORKS
There are many ongoing initiatives to combat virulent
pandemics, including COVID-19. These initiatives include vaccine
sharing frameworks and collaborative projects, all aimed at increasing
access to medicine or treatment related IP for notable pathogens
ranging from the common influenza to HIV/AIDS.54 The key players
in designing and implementing these frameworks are usually
intergovernmental organizations (“IGOs”), particularly the World
Health Organization (“WHO”), World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”), World Trade Organization (“WTO”),
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), and World Bank. Although
these projects are robust, their hosting organizations have so far been

Id.
Id.
52 Id.
53
Georgina Drury et al., Process Mapping of Vaccines: Understanding the
Limitations in Current Response to Emerging Epidemic Threats, 37 VACCINE 2415, 2418
(2019) (describing the process of sourcing and purifying raw materials, testing them
for viability, adding stabilizers and preservatives, and packaging the final product for
distribution).
54 See supra Parts II.A & II.B.
50
51
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unable to efficiently leverage their infrastructure and procedures to
combat COVID-19.
As early as 2016, the WHO recognized that the status quo left
nations vulnerable to rapidly-spreading emerging diseases and
published a comprehensive action plan in an effort to right the ship.55
Styled as an “R&D Blueprint,” the action plan’s goal was to create a
framework that would bring interests into better alignment and ensure
the whole world—both north and south—was better prepared to deal
with future outbreaks of emerging diseases.56
In May 2020, the World Health Assembly (“WHA”),
recognizing the existential threat COVID-19 posed to global health
interests, charged the Director-General of the WHO to form what
became the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness &
Response (the “Independent Panel”).57 The purpose of the
Independent Panel was to “initiate an impartial, independent, and
comprehensive review of the international health response to COVID19 and of experiences gained and lessons learned from it, and to make
recommendations to improve capacities for the future.”58 In a report,
the Independent Panel recognized several key issues which contributed
to the breakdown in the healthcare response including that: (1)
countries and healthcare initiatives were reluctant to implement
healthcare experts’ recommendations in a timely manner; (2) national
pandemic preparedness initiatives were underfunded; (3) national
governments lacked comprehensive preparedness plans with multisectoral coordination and contingencies; and (4) international
collaboration projects failed to gain traction or broad support in time
to be effective.59

55
WORLD HEALTH ORG., COVID-19 RESEARCH AND INNOVATION
ACHIEVEMENTS 18 (2021), https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-19research-and-innovation-achievements [hereinafter R&D Blueprint].
56 See Rutschman, supra note 9, at 170.
57
INDEP. PANEL FOR PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE, COVID19: MAKE IT THE LAST PANDEMIC 8 (2021), https://theindependentpanel.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/COVID-19-Make-it-the-Last-Pandemic_final.pdf.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 15–19, 28, 38, 41.
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Bearing in mind these findings, this Part will discuss existing
vaccine sharing frameworks and international collaborative projects
before analyzing their effectiveness and drawbacks. Of the issues that
the Independent Panel identified, this Part will focus on the lack of
funding and collaboration to share resources, medicines, and IP.
A. Existing Vaccine Sharing Frameworks
1. COVAX (Gavi)
An attempt to balance the interests of wealthy producer
countries with poorer ones, COVAX is a mechanism for getting
COVID-19 vaccines into the hands of countries in the global south
where they were desperately needed, but in short supply.60 Its premise
is that, when many countries have access to an effective vaccine
collectively, each benefits individually.61 As Health Affairs reported,
the project’s selling point is that, “Wealthier countries get the promise
of guaranteed access to a broader pool of potentially effective vaccines,
and the entire world’s population gets vaccinated, enabling the global
economy to reopen.”62
A collaboration between the WHO, the Coalition for
Epidemic Preparedness (“CEPI”), the United Nations Children’s
Fund (“UNICEF”), and Gavi, the Global Vaccine Alliance, COVAX
enlists wealthier countries to fund research and pre-purchase vaccine
doses that are then distributed to countries according to need, rather
than ability to pay.63 The goal is to produce and distribute enough
vaccine doses that at least 20% of the population of participating states
can be vaccinated by the end of 2021.64 Twenty percent of the
population is significant—enough to potentially provide for the
vaccination of the elderly and otherwise vulnerable, but not enough to
affect the spread of the disease.65

60
61
62
63
64
65

Meyer, supra note 22, at 1857.
Id.
Id.
Joseph & Dore, supra note 44.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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While it has played an important role in developing the
Moderna, AstraZeneca, Inovio, and Novavax Vaccines, to date
COVAX cannot be characterized as an international success.66 In order
to attract wealthier countries to participate, COVAX organizers
redesigned the program to be less strict, allowing funding countries to
retain more control over the vaccines they paid for.67 Nevertheless, key
players like the United States still declined to participate.68 By the time
the deadline for commitments had passed, seventy-eight wealthier
countries and ninety-two poorer countries had agreed to participate.69
Participating states contributed more than $1.4 billion to the program
but the WHO reported that it needed half that sum to effectively
capitalize on research and development opportunities.70 Wary of
placing all their eggs in the COVAX basket, participating states have
continued to broker independent deals with pharmaceutical companies
on terms less conducive to global vaccine sharing.71 Finally and most
recently, COVAX has suffered from supply issues.72 Its distribution
plans relied on large shipments of the AstraZeneca vaccine pledged by
the Serum Institute of India, but when COVID-19 fatalities began to
surge in India, those shipments were delayed indefinitely.73
2. International COVID-IP Pledge
During ordinary times, patents and copyrights spur innovation
and motivate inventors and artists to create work they can monetize.
In times of crisis, however, they can prevent critical information from
spreading, thus impeding the development of vaccines and
treatments.74 To facilitate information sharing, a multitude of
businesses have pledged to license some or all of their IP for the
Meyer, supra note 22, at 1857.
See id.
68
A White House Spokesperson explained that COVAX is “influenced by
the corrupt World Health Organization and China.” Id. at 1857.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1857 (“[A]n additional $1 billion is needed to move the research and
development portfolio forward, according to the WHO.”).
71 Id.
72
Joseph & Dore, supra note 44, at 4.
73 Id.
74
Jorge L. Contreras et al., Pledging Intellectual Property for COVID-19, 38
NATURE BIOTECH. 1146, 1146 (2020).
66
67
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duration of the pandemic.75 These companies include Microsoft,
Amazon, IBM, Intel, Hewlett Packard, and Facebook.76 Relevant
products produced by these companies can be readily licensed by
anyone who intends to use them for “ending and mitigating the
COVID-19 pandemic.”77
These pledges are organic, voluntary, and spontaneous; no
body enforces or oversees them, and each company sets its own
terms.78 Some pledges are more formal than others, however. The
Welcome Trust Publisher’s Pledge, Open COVID Pledge, and Open
COVID-19 Declaration, for instance, serve as charters to which willing
companies can accede.79 To prevent scalpers, many of these voluntary
licenses contain “share alike” provisions requiring that those who use
the licensed IP to create new products or works make those products
or works available under the same terms as the license.80
Considering the success of open-source software; it comes as
no surprise that most of the companies willing to grant these pandemic
licenses have tech pedigrees. With few exceptions, the pledges have
not caught on with pharmaceutical companies.81 Oxford University
made waves when it announced its intention to donate the rights to its
COVID-19 vaccine to a drugmaker for free.82 Despite multiple
announcements and public commitments to provide a vaccine at low
cost or for free, Oxford quietly changed course in 2020 and sold its
vaccine to AstraZeneca.83 The deal contained no provisions
guaranteeing broad access or low prices.84 Many considered the sale to
be a frustrating relapse into a flawed status quo. “If there was ever an
75
WORLD TRADE ORG, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND COVID-19 at 1
(2020), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trips_report_e.pdf.
76 Id. at 4.
77 Id.
78
Contreras et al., supra note 74.
79 Id. at 1147.
80 Id. at 1147–48.
81 Id.
82
Jay Hancock, They Pledged to Donate Rights to Their COVID Vaccine, then Sold
them to Pharma, KHN (Aug. 25, 2020), https://khn.org/news/rather-than-give-awayits-covid-vaccine-oxford-makes-a-deal-with-drugmaker/.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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opportunity,” wrote Ameet Sarpatwari of Harvard Medical School,
“this would have been it.”85 Instead of providing the vaccine in a way
guaranteed to allow affordable access, “it is business as usual, where
the manufacturers are getting exclusive rights and we are hoping on
the basis of public sentiment that they will price their products
responsibly.”86
3. International Drug Purchase Facility
Designed to “build new international approaches towards
ensuring universal access to, and efficient national systems of
procurement and distribution for anti-Tuberculosis drugs,”87 the
Global Drug Facility is an arm of the WHO.88 It has a mandate to
ensure that countries have ready access to tuberculosis drugs, stimulate
political support for anti-tuberculosis measures, and ultimately secure
the control and elimination of the disease entirely.89 Primarily, the
Global Drug Facility sets international quality standards for
tuberculosis drugs.90 By encouraging new suppliers, consolidating
orders, and implementing “a competitive and transparent tendering
process among the manufacturers,” the Global Drug Facility has been
able to significantly reduce the prices of tuberculosis drugs over time.91
UNITAID is an International Drug Purchase Facility funded
by a creative scheme of international taxation.92 Frustrated by the toll
that diseases like malaria, HIV, and tuberculosis were taking on the
world, and the inadequate resources available to address these diseases
in a global way, five national governments joined together in 2006 to
Id.
Id.
87
Robert Matiru and Timothy Ryan, The Global Drug Facility: A Unique,
Holistic and Pioneering Approach to Drug Procurement and Management, 85 WORLD HEALTH
ORG. BULL. 348, 348 (2007) (quoting the Global Drug Facility’s prospectus).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 352.
90
Kaspars Lunte, Thierry Cordier-Lassalle, and Joel Keravec, Reducing the
Price of Treatment for Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis through the Global Drug Facility, 93
WORLD HEALTH ORG. BULL. 279, 282 (2015) [hereinafter Lunte].
91 Id. at 280.
92
CATHERINE A. WITHROW, POLITICAL WILL AND THE GLOBAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITAID AND THE AIRLINE TICKET TAX 17 (2007).
85
86
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create a new drug purchase facility.93 UNITAID’s goal is to increase
access to treatment and diagnostics for malaria, HIV, and tuberculosis
in the poorest areas of the world.94 Unlike other international health
initiatives, which are often financially neglected, UNITAID had the
good fortune of being conceived with a built-in financing mechanism:
an international tax on airline ticket sales.95 Certain states that have
adopted UNITAID—chiefly France and Chile—charge a solidarity fee
on commercial flights to and from their countries.96 They then use the
money to place massive orders with pharmaceutical companies, relying
on volume-buying to secure steep discounts.97 Between 2006 and 2011,
eight countries agreed to participate in the airline tax.98 In those five
years, the tax generated $2 billion, which comprised 80% of
UNITAID’s funding.99
This built-in funding mechanism is UNITAID’s differentiating
quality and greatest strength. However, the drug purchase facility has
been criticized on other grounds. A persistent criticism is that medical
infrastructure, not drug availability, is the chief problem facing poor
countries in their battles against HIV and tuberculosis.100 Drugs are
useless, the criticism argues, if there are no trained doctors to
administer them and no safe facilities to administer them in.101 The
other frequent criticism of UNITAID is that its efforts are duplicative
of existing programs and that its administration expenses on the back-

Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 17.
95 Id. at 19.
96 Id. at 21–22.
97 Id.
98
Denis Broun, UNITAID Innovative Financing Mechanism, WORLD HEALTH
ORG.,
at
*2
(Oct.
2011),
https://www.who.int/hiv/amds/unitaid_oct2011.pdf?ua=1
[https://perma.cc/B4Y6-MSHQ].
99 Id.
100
JEREMIAH NORRIS AND S. JEAN WEICHER, UNITAID/IDPF: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG PURCHASE FACILITY 10 (Center for
Science in Public Policy 2006).
101 Id.
93
94
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end of distributing drugs result in higher prices for the countries it
serves.102
B. Collaborative Projects
1. Trilateral Cooperation Agreement for the COVID-19
Pandemic
An exciting step toward a more collaborative future, the
Trilateral Cooperation Agreement for the COVID-19 Pandemic
established the foundation for a partnership between the WHO,
WTO, and WIPO.103 This agreement unites the foremost IGOs
representing the interests of public health organizations, (WHO),
pharmaceutical companies, (WIPO), and the financial world, (WTO).
The partnership is informal, without a charter or contract to hold it
together or set its boundaries. The WIPO explains the relationship as
a loose but robust and results-oriented one:
The three organizations meet regularly, exchange
information on their respective work programs and
discuss and plan, within the possibilities of their
respective mandates and budgets, common activities.
The trilateral cooperation is intended to contribute to
enhancing the empirical and factual information basis
for policy makers and supporting them in addressing
public health in relation to IP and trade. The WHO
Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health,
Innovation and IP, the WIPO Development Agenda
and the WTO Declaration on the TRIPS agreement
and public health, provide the broader context for an

102 Id. at 20. It should be noted that this analysis has aged poorly in some
ways. “Issues of price, demand and drug supply were yesterday’s problems,” its
authors wrote in 2006, with optimism that the passing years have demonstrated to
have been misplaced.
103 WHO, WIPO, WTO launch updated study on access to medical technologies and
innovation,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
(Jul.
29,
2020),
https://www.who.int/news/item/29-07-2020-who-wipo-wto-launch-updatedstudy-on-access-to-medical-technologies-and-innovation [hereinafter WHO Launch].
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informal and practical trilateral cooperation at the
working level.104
In announcing the collaboration, WTO Director General
Roberto Azevedo emphasized the need for all three organizations to
form collaborative and coherent policies, taking account of each
other’s interests.105 “Close collaboration between our three specialized
agencies has yielded important practical benefits,” he said.106 “It is only
through joint efforts at the global level that we can achieve our shared
public health goals.”107
The tangible product of the collaboration is a sprawling
research study: the Trilateral Study on Promoting Access to Medical
Technologies and Innovation.108 This study “highlights the interplay
between the distinct policy domains of health, trade, and intellectual
property, and how they affect innovation and access to medical
technologies, such as medicines, vaccines, and medical devices.”109 It
is designed to aid policy makers in navigating the political, economic,
health, and intellectual property challenges inherent in addressing the
pandemic.110
The cooperation has been so successful that in May 2021, the
World Health Assembly held a special session to discuss the possibility
of enshrining the partnership in more formal terms.111 It proposed that
a convention, agreement, or other international instrument on
104 WHO, WIPO, WTO Trilateral Cooperation on Public Health, IP and Trade,
WORLD
INT’L
PROP.
ORG.
(2020),
https://www.wipo.int/policy/en/global_health/trilateral_cooperation.html.
105
WHO Launch, supra note 103.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108
WORLD HEALTH ORG. et al., PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES
AND
INNOVATION
(2d.
Ed.
2020),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/who-wipo-wto-2020_e.pdf.
109
WHO Launch, supra note 103.
110 Id.
111 Special session of the World Health Assembly to Consider Developing a WHO
Convention, Agreement or Other International Instrument on Pandemic Preparedness and
Response, WORLD HEALTH ORG. Doc. WHA74(16) (May 31, 2021),
https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA74/A74(16)-en.pdf.
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pandemic preparedness and response be signed by member states,
bringing together the same key players.112 The World Health Assembly
convened in December 2021 to discuss the proposal further and
potentially prepare a draft convention.113
The great strength of this Trilateral Cooperation Agreement is
its inclusivity: it brings together several of the key stakeholders
involved in brokering solutions to the conflicts of interest discussed
above. By ensuring that these sometimes-disparate voices are in
frequent touch with each other, it increases the likelihood of
democratic solutions working themselves out organically between the
parties. It facilitates communication and understanding. It allows
institutional knowledge to be shared across disciplines. Perhaps most
importantly, it allows the IGOs involved to compare notes, ensuring
that their goals are uniform.
However, the weakness of the collaboration is its informality.
There is nothing obligating the IGOs to coordinate, and they are
treated the same collectively as they are separately. Their cooperation
does not constitute a new super-IGO or international organization.
Accordingly, some synergies between their institutional expertise must
necessarily be missed as they tackle projects separately. While the
report they produce is very useful, a single document is far short of
what these IGOs could accomplish if they came together more
formally.
2. Pandemic Flu Preparedness Framework
Another project of the WHO, the Pandemic Flu Preparedness
Framework is an attempt to create a global surveillance and response
system for influenza.114 Its primary purpose is to provide ready and
equitable access to vaccines and information about viruses with the

Id.
Id.
114
WORLD HEALTH ORG., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS
FRAMEWORK FOR THE SHARING OF INFLUENZA VIRUSES AND ACCESS TO
VACCINES
AND
OTHER
BENEFITS
(2d
ed.
2021),
https://apps.who.int/iris/rest/bitstreams/1351857/retrieve.
112
113
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potential to cause human pandemics.115 As the name suggests,
however, its scope is limited to H5N1 avian flu, with all other
diseases—and even other strains of influenza—specifically
excepted.116
The World Health Assembly adopted the framework in 2011,
urging member states to accept it and allocate enough resources for its
local implementation.117 Signatories agree to share H5N1 vaccines
amongst themselves in proportion to public health risk and need.118
They agree to collect biological material from suspected H5N1 cases
and rapidly share it with WHO laboratories, allowing member states to
catch outbreaks in a timely manner.119 Further, they agree to certain
tracing and reporting mechanisms, the genetic sequencing of collected
data, the provision of diagnostic test kits, etc.120 The Flu Preparedness
Framework creates a general vaccine stockpile with contributions from
member states, but also provides that a portion of vaccines
manufactured be set aside for special distribution to developing
countries.121 The framework acknowledges the problem of IP
licensing, but stops short of proposing any concrete solutions.122
The Pandemic Flu Preparedness Framework is a step in the
right direction for global pandemic response and prevention. Of
special interest are its provisions for monitoring and responding to the
spread of H5N1. Rather than focusing narrowly on treating cases, the
framework takes a broader approach and attempts to limit, or at least
Id. at 1.
Id. at 7 (“This Framework does not apply to seasonal influenza viruses or
other non-influenza pathogens or biological substances that may be contained in
clinical specimens shared under this Framework”).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 3.
119 Id. at 12.
120 Id. at 12–17.
121 Id. at 18–19.
122 Id. at 4 (“[I]ntellectual property rights do not and should not prevent
Member States from taking measures to protect public health.” “[I]ntellectual
property rights are an important incentive in the development of new health care
products. However, this incentive alone does not meet the need for the development
of new products to fight diseases where the potential paying market is small or
uncertain.”).
115
116
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monitor, the spread of H5N1 on a global scale.123 This broader
approach is laudable. Taking into account the full lifecycle of a
pandemic, from its origins and spread through to its treatment and
eradication, allows the WHO to take more informed and effective
action.
While the framework adopts a broad approach in the way it
considers H5N1, its failure to consider anything else limits its utility in
the COVID-19 context. Like so many other collaborative projects, the
Flu Preparedness Framework is a narrowly tailored solution devised in
response to a particular threat. Despite being a largely successful and
promising initiative, the framework is an example of the fundamentally
reactive nature of most international public health solutions. Public
health organizations create frameworks in the immediate aftermath of
a disease crisis, narrowly tailored to prevent the reemergence of that
particular threat or strain—in this case H5N1. Even when created with
the best intentions and most deliberate attention, these frameworks are
unhelpful when it comes to catching or preventing new strains or
threats. Accordingly, when a new threat emerges—and one always
does—it catches the world unprepared.
3. Multilateral COVID-19 Task Force
The final and most relevant project currently underway is the
Multilateral COVID-19 Task Force (“Task Force”). A joint initiative
of the IMF, World Bank, WHO, and WTO, its goal is to accelerate the
distribution of COVID-19 vaccines to developing countries by
harnessing the power of the financial markets.124 Because vaccines, like
any commodity, must navigate governments’ regulatory landscapes to
be bought or sold, there are often financial or trade roadblocks in the
way of fast and efficient distribution.125 The Task Force seeks to
remove these obstacles, harnessing the institutional knowledge and
123 WHO Launches New Global Influenza Strategy, WORLD HEALTH. ORG. (Mar.
11, 2019), https://www.who.int/news/item/11-03-2019-who-launches-new-globalinfluenza-strategy [https://perma.cc/C7DX-H6JN].
124 About,
COVID19TASKFORCE.COM,
https://www.covid19taskforce.com/en/programs/task-force-on-covid-19vaccines/about (last visited Dec. 30, 2021) [https://perma.cc/7JQ5-89WK].
125 Id.
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authority of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO to do so.126 The Task
Force is an exciting marriage of public health and trade expertise. By
putting the IMF, World Bank, and WTO at the same table as the
WHO, it opens doors that would not otherwise be available.
One IGO is notable by its absence from the Task Force.
Despite the conflict between public health and IP interests being at the
very heart of pandemic containment, the WIPO does not play a role
in the Task Force. Without the WIPO or other similarly purposed
organization, IP rights holders have no true voice for their interests on
the task force. This stunts the capability of what might otherwise be a
robust and durable solution.
C. Drawbacks of the Current Frameworks and Projects
These frameworks and collaborative projects all suffer from
the same defects. Those that are robust enough to make a difference
are too narrow to be broadly useful, and those with enough scope to
cover emerging diseases are not empowered to make a difference. The
narrow scope of international vaccine and information sharing
frameworks is a product of underfunding, which is itself a symptom of
a lack of political will behind them. Further, most solutions are the
products of only one IGO—the WHO.127 Of course, the WHO ought
to drive the discourse, but for solutions to be enduring, there must be
more seats at the table. Groups like the WIPO and World Bank should
be included from a project’s earliest stages to ensure that the interests
of vaccine manufacturers and developing nations are represented.
Finally, solutions to date have failed to adequately incentivize vaccine
manufacturers to issue voluntary licenses for their IP.
1. Lack of Funding
Although it has been instrumental in overcoming or curbing
the effects of pathogenic threats like HIV/AIDS, SARS, Zika and
Ebola over the past seventy years, the WHO is still woefully

126
127

Id.
See supra Part III.A, III.B.
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underfunded.128 Its two-year budget for the 2020-2021 term is only
$4.84 billion,129 which is a $420 million increase from its $4.42 billion
budget for 2018-2019.130 The WHO’s financial plight may be illustrated
by pointing to the $6.99 billion operating budget of a single leading
American hospital system in 2015.131 The public health organization
responsible for tracking and treating diseases across the whole world
has less funding than a regional hospital system.
The WHO’s funding structure relies on two forms of revenue:
assessed contributions and voluntary contributions.132 Assessed
contributions are the “dues” that each Member state pays annually
based on their GDP.133 Voluntary contributions are donations or gifts
which can come from a variety of sources including Member States,
IGOs, philanthropic initiatives and the private sector.134 In recent
years, the WHO has relied on voluntary contributions to form the bulk
of the budget.135 These voluntary contributions are often pre-allocated

128
Lawrence Gostin & Sarah Wetter, Two Legal Experts Explain Why the U.S.
Should Not Pull Funding from the WHO Amid COVID-19 Pandemic, FORBES (Apr. 13,
2020,
9:55
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/coronavirusfrontlines/2020/04/13/two-legalexperts-explain-why-the-us-should-not-pull-funding-from-the-world-healthorganization-amid-covid-19/?sh=242e67531df7.
129 Programme
Budget 2020–2021, WORLD HEALTH ORG. Doc.
WHO/PRP/19.1 at 7 (May 30, 2019).
130 Overview of Financial Situation: Programme Budget 2018–2019, WHO Doc.
A72/34
at
2
(May
13,
2019),
https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA72/A72_34-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HF2Y-ZQVY].
131 A Look at Our Books: Fiscal Year 2015 Capital Budget and Annual Operating
Plan,
JOHNS
HOPKINS
MED.
1,
1
(2015),
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/publications/_docs/operating_capital_b
udget_infographic.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRN6-G2FB].
132 How
WHO
is
Funded,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
https://www.who.int/about/funding
(last
visited
Sep.
27,
2021),
[https://perma.cc/U3VR-HQ8R].
133 Id.
134 Id.
135
Charles Clift, What’s the World Health Organization For?, THE ROYAL
INSTITUTE OF INT’L AFFS., CHATHAM HOUSE 1, 28 (May 2014),
http://ghiadvisors.org/Docs/WHOHealthGovernanceClift.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PU6U-9CBF].
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toward certain initiatives by the donors.136 Not only does this decrease
transparency as to where and why money is being spent, it forces the
WHO to support certain initiatives over others, regardless of their
priority at the time.137 Many donors only support the WHO through
voluntary contributions if they can decide where their money is
spent.138 Previous initiatives like the Contingency Fund for
Emergencies (“CFE”) were pitifully unsuccessful because they relied
solely on voluntary donations that could not be earmarked for specific
activities.139 From 2018–19, the CFE barely raised enough money to
support a response to a minor Ebola outbreak in a single country.140
The WHO must therefore rely on state contributions to cover its
operating costs which is why it and many other IGOs141 are chronically
underfunded. This limits their ability to participate in projects outside
their wheelhouse. It results in narrow, reactive solutions like the
Pandemic Preparedness Framework and limits the possibility of
broader, preventative solutions.
The UNITAID International Drug Purchase Facility offers a
useful model for funding public health projects between nations. While
unable to levy domestic taxes, IGOs can be the beneficiaries of
international taxes. UNITAID is evidence that international pandemic
response programs work best when they are conceived with a built-in
funding mechanism independent of their parent organizations.

See Gostin & Wetter, supra note 128.
Clift, supra note 135, at 30.
138 See Gostin & Wetter, supra note 128.
139 Id.
140 Id.; see also Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE), WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/funding/contingency-fund-for-emergencies
(last visited Dec. 18, 2021), [https://perma.cc/B3DD-RUHT] (detailing the 2021
financial contributions to the CFE that only amounted to $45 million); cf. Pakistan,
KPMG,
https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2020/04/pakistangovernment-and-institution-measures-in-response-to-covid.html (last updated June
24, 2020), [https://perma.cc/H82A-JGQ5] (stating that Pakistan, the 46th largest
economy by GDP, spent over $6.7 billion in COVID-19 relief packages in 2020. This
is more than 148 times what the CFE received in donations in 2021).
141
Which IGOs?
136
137
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2. Lack of Incentive for Rights-Holders to License IP
As previously noted, it is expensive to develop new vaccines.142
Pharmaceutical companies are willing to undertake expensive R&D in
part because patents make it possible for them to control the
distribution and price of the resulting products. Having spent the
money to develop a new vaccine, relying on a monopoly to recover the
initial outlay and turn a profit, pharmaceutical companies are
understandably unwilling to give away their formulas or sell them at a
discount.143 Nevertheless, because national governments are wary of
the consequences of enforcing compulsory licenses, pandemic
response to date has depended on the issuance of voluntary licenses.144
Without some added incentive, however, these voluntary licenses are
elusive.145 Why would a pharmaceutical company voluntarily trade
away its profits, or perform labor-intensive R&D for free? With the
whole weight of economics on one side of the scale and mere altruism
on the other, most corporations have not found it to be a close
question. To be sustainable, a lasting pandemic response framework
must rebalance the scales by adding economic incentives that weigh in
favor of granting licenses.
IV. PROPOSED BLUEPRINT FOR A MULTILATERAL PANDEMIC
RESPONSE COUNCIL
Given the circumstances of the 2020–21 pandemic era, the
initiatives mentioned in the previous Part arguably fulfilled their basic
purpose: to combat the COVID-19 virus, in its original form, through
technology sharing and collaborative development. That said,
See Olivier J. Woulters, Martin McKee, and Jeroen Luyten, Estimated
Research and Development Investment Needed to Bring a New Medicine to Market, 323 JAMA
844 (Mar. 3, 2020).
143 See Rutschman, supra note 9, at 174.
144 Supra Part II.A.1.b; see Jay Hancock, They Pledged to Donate Rights to Their
COVID Vaccine, then Sold them to Pharma, KHN (Aug. 25, 2020),
https://khn.org/news/rather-than-give-away-its-covid-vaccine-oxford-makes-adeal-with-drugmaker/.
145
Jay Hancock, They Pledged to Donate Rights to Their COVID Vaccine, then
Sold them to Pharma, KHN (Aug. 25, 2020), https://khn.org/news/rather-than-giveaway-its-covid-vaccine-oxford-makes-a-deal-with-drugmaker/.
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COVID-19 variants146 continue to spread across the world at alarming
speed. As of the writing of this Article, thousands of variants have been
identified.147 Although only five are considered variants of concern,148
it is indisputable that the longer the pandemic draws on, the more
variants will develop that either decrease the effectiveness of existing
antiviral technologies or render them ineffective altogether.
The COVID-19 pandemic has also revealed glaring flaws in
the global healthcare network that future viruses could potentially
exploit to bring about even more devastating pandemics. By far, the
largest deficiency in the global response to COVID-19 is that it was
not a unified global response. Although pharmaceutical companies were
able to develop a vaccine for the original virus in record time, politics,
supply issues, and vaccine nationalism prevented rapid production and
equitable distribution efforts from being realized before significant
variants of concern (such as the Delta and Omicron variants) began
impacting their effectiveness.
This Part will present a detailed plan for a new organization, a
Multilateral Council on Pandemic Response (hereinafter the Council).
It will have the ability to strengthen international IP collaboration and
sharing through a broad range of powers. Chief among those powers
would be the ability to investigate global pathogenic events and
institute a variety of IP licensing regimes to increase antiviral
technology development and distribution in a timely manner. This Part
will also propose a regulatory structure that would allow the Council
146 Tracking
SARS-CoV-2
Variants,
WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/en/activities/tracking-SARS-CoV-2-variants/ (last visited
Oct. 19, 2021), [https://perma.cc/X87Z-XSGC] (explaining that variants are
mutations of an original virus that occur over time. Although most have no impact
on the the virus’s properties, some variants “affect the virus’s properties, such as how
easily it spreads, the associated disease severity, or the performance of vaccines,
therapeutic medicines, diagnostic tools, or other public health and social measures.”).
147
Meryl Davids Landau, Is a Variant Worse than Delta on the Way? Viral
Evolution
Offers
Clues,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(Sep.
17,
2021),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/is-a-variant-worse-thandelta-on-the-way-viral-evolution-offers-clues [https://perma.cc/N27C-MEY2].
148 Tracking
SARS-CoV-2
Variants,
WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/en/activities/tracking-SARS-CoV-2-variants/ (last visited
Oct. 19, 2021), [https://perma.cc/X87Z-XSGC].
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to establish pipelines for raw materials essential to antiviral treatments.
Additionally, it will advance an argument for an internal dispute
resolution system to expeditiously resolve legal claims that might
hinder the Council’s mission. Finally, this Part proposes a funding
structure similar to tried and tested systems already in effect to combat
other diseases, as well as a novel approach.
A. Participating Entities
The Council must have the ability to influence different sectors
of the global network so that it can effectively manage the various
facets of healthcare IP and end product distribution. The Trilateral
Cooperation Agreement discussed above demonstrates the need for
IGO cooperation to address all aspects of a global vaccination
initiative.149 Relevant sectors include intellectual property, healthcare,
and international trade, touching the expertise of the WIPO, WHO,
and WTO. The Council would build on that spirit of cooperation by
further incorporating the perspectives and cooperation of the IMF and
the World Bank.
1. Responsibilities of Each IGO
With so many moving parts and organizations at play, the
Council must define clear areas of influence for each IGO so as to
minimize confusion as to what each organization’s role is. Each IGO
has the ability to control their own area of influence while still
contributing knowledge and manpower to develop solutions that
touch on multiple areas of influence.
Like in several of the newer cooperation agreements including
the Trilateral Cooperation Agreement, 150 the WHO, WIPO, and WTO
will form the backbone of the Council. The WHO is a specialized
United Nations agency that “connects nations, partners and people to
promote health, keep the world safe, and serve the vulnerable” through
“expand[ing] universal health coverage.”151 It also coordinates global
See supra III.B.
See supra Part III.B.1.
151 About WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/about (last
visited Nov. 24, 2021).
149
150
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responses to health emergencies by gathering data on potential
healthcare emergencies152 and grading those emergencies to determine
whether to trigger WHO protocols.153 Those protocols include
activating initiatives like the R&D Blueprint, which is a “global strategy
and preparedness plan that allows the rapid activation of research and
development activities during epidemics.”154 The R&D Blueprint for
COVID-19 is comprehensive and details the WHO’s efforts towards
developing disease identification and vaccine development initiatives
into global collaboration projects.155 These responsibilities, namely
threat detection and response coordination, would carry over to the
WHO’s responsibilities in the Council. Where its efforts would benefit
from the Council is in enhanced threat detection, treatment research
and development, and therapeutic production.
Treatment research and development largely hinges on
intellectual property issues. Because of the exorbitant costs of
researching and developing medical treatments, pharmaceutical
companies often protect their research and products with a myriad of
process and utility patents.156 Although patents disclose the best
method to make the invention, pharmaceutical companies also use
trade secrets to protect critical components of a pharmaceutical’s
design to further discourage replication.157 These patents and trade
Surveillance,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/surveillance (last visited Nov. 24, 2021)
(describing the WHO’s ability to collect health-related data and disease surveillance
data to identify potential outbreaks); see also Risk Assessments, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/risk-assessments (last visited Nov. 24, 2021)
(describing the public health related risk assessments the WHO presents to the UN
Secretary-General’s Office); WHO Grading of Public Health Events and Emergencies,
WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/emergencies/grading (last visited
Nov. 24, 2021).
153 WHO Grading of Public Health Events and Emergencies, supra note 152.
154 R&D
Blueprint and COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/teams/blueprint/covid-19 (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
155 COVID-19 Research and Innovation Achievements, WORLD HEALTH ORG., at
6–15, 18 (Apr. 2021), https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-19research-and-innovation-achievements.
156
Stanley Plotkin et al., The Complexity and Cost of Vaccine Manufacturing – An
Overview, 35 VACCINE 4064, 4065 (2017).
157
Allison Durkin et al., Addressing the Risks that Trade Secret Protections Pose for
Health and Rights, 23 HEALTH & HUMAN RIGHTS J., 129, 132–34 (2021).
152
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secrets impact collaboration and the licensing initiatives that will be
proposed later in this Part. As the leading IP-focused IGO, the WIPO
is well suited to deal with these issues in the context of global
healthcare.158 WIPO’s mission includes “shap[ing] international IP
rules” and providing “global services to protect IP across borders and
to resolve disputes.”159 Additionally, it provides “technical
infrastructure to connect IP systems and share knowledge,” and
supports “cooperation and capacity-building programs to enable all
countries to use IP for economic, social and cultural development.”160
In the existing Trilateral Cooperation Agreement, the WIPO
attempted to fulfil that mandate by developing IP training institutions
and hosting technology transfer and licensing workshops.161 Its role in
the new Council would expand its responsibilities into regulating
licensing frameworks and incentivizing voluntary technology sharing
while still preserving IP-holders’ rights.162
Favorable trading conditions are also key to a rapid response
to an emergency. Access to a consistent supply of raw materials, or
lack thereof, is a frequent impediment that hinders pharmaceutical
companies’ response to global health events. Vaccine manufacturers
often have to source components from all over the world.163 Trading
those components in a cost effective and timely manner will allow for
faster research, scaled up production, and more efficient

Inside WIPO, WORLD INT’L PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/aboutwipo/en/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 WIPO’s COVID-19 Related Services and Support, WORLD INT’L PROP. ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/covid-19/en/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
162 See supra Part III.B.2.
163
Shyam Rele, COVID-19 Vaccine Development During Pandemic: Gap Analysis,
Opportunities, and Impact on Future Emerging Infectious Disease Development Strategies, HUM.
VACCINES
&
IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS
1,
1–2
(2020),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21645515.2020.1822136
[https://perma.cc/LE2L-MNCH].
158
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distribution.164 The WTO facilitates trading between nations.165 Its goal
is to “ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as
possible.”166 It accomplishes this by removing red tape and expediting
transit for trade goods.167 The WTO is currently working on an
expedited vaccine delivery method that includes measures such as (1)
expediting vaccine approval, (2) expediting border clearances, (3)
encouraging member states to lower tariffs on therapeutics, and (4)
relaxing regulatory standards.168 The WTO’s role while on the Council
during future pandemics would mirror these responsibilities as well as
facilitating raw material procurement. International trade collaboration
through incentivization or tariffs, if necessary, will streamline the endto-end process of vaccine development and distribution.
The last two members of the Council are the IMF and the
World Bank. The IMF is an IGO with over 190 member states that is
tasked with “foster[ing] global monetary cooperation, secur[ing]
financial stability, facilitat[ing] international trade, promot[ing] high
employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduc[ing] poverty
around the world.”169 As discussed earlier, insufficient funding has
restricted many of the WHO’s initiatives.170 The IMF has experience
developing innovative financing structures to support WHO-led
healthcare initiatives.171 Liaising with it to manage the organization’s
financial support structure would bring logistical and experiential
support from seasoned financial experts.

164 See Chad P. Brown & Thomas J. Bollyky, The World Needs a COVID-19
Vaccine Investment and Trade Agreement, in PIIE BRIEFING 21-3: MAKING THE MOST
OF THE 2021 WTO MINISTERIAL, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 6, 6, 8–9 (Oct.
2021), https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/piieb21-3.pdf.
165 The
WTO,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 The Global Race to Vaccinate COVID-19, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Aug. 10,
2021),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/global_race_infographic_e.pdf.
169 About
the
IMF,
INT’L
MONETARY
FUND,
https://www.imf.org/en/About (last visited Oct. 19, 2021).
170 See supra Part II.C.1.
171 See supra Part III.C.1.
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The World Bank would support the IMF with financing
structures and dispute resolution in lower-to-middle income countries
(“LMICs”). While the IMF primarily works to stabilize international
financial and monetary systems, the World Bank “works with
developing countries to reduce poverty and increase shared
prosperity.”172 Since the start of the pandemic, the World Bank has
focused on mitigating the economic effects of the lockdowns,
facilitating investments in LMICs, and funding vaccine initiatives that
deliver treatments and personal protective equipment to those
countries.173
The World Bank also has a dispute resolution arm, the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”), that deals with international investment dispute
settlement.174 ICSID arbitrates disputes between international actors
arising out of matters including financing, technology, and
investment.175 The World Bank’s existing experience in dealing with
global disasters and its dispute resolution platform would bring
versatility and feasibility to the Council.

The World Bank Group and The International Monetary Fund (IMF), WORLD
BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/history/the-world-bank-group-andthe-imf (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
173 How the World Bank Group is Helping Countries Address COVID-19
(Coronavirus),
WORLD
BANK,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/02/11/how-the-worldbank-group-is-helping-countries-withcovid-19-coronavirus (last updated Oct. 1, 2021). See also World Bank Financing for
COVID-19 Vaccine Rollout Reaches $2 Billion, WORLD BANK (Apr. 20, 2021),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/04/20/world-bankfinancing-for-covid-19-vaccine-rollout-reaches-2-billion (detailing the World Bank’s
$6 billion in donations to funding vaccine and personal protective equipment
initiatives in LMICs as well as its overall plan to finance $12 billion into the project
over 24 months).
174 About ICSID, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/About/ICSID (last visited Nov. 28, 2021).
175 See generally, Introducing ICSID, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
at
1
(last
visited
Nov.
24,
2021),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/ICSID_Primer_1.16.19.pdf
(describing the capabilities and purpose of ICSID).
172
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Together the WHO, WIPO, WTO, IMF, and World Bank
would form the core of the new Council. Similar to how countries are
represented in the UN, each IGO would have delegates that would
represent their interests on the Council and liaise with state actors and
non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) in their area of
expertise.176 Delegates from each relevant IGO would be in
subcommittees based on the responsibilities outlined in the Council’s
Scope of Charter below.
B. Scope of Charter
As a preliminary matter, and because of the wealth of talent
that the previous Section involves, the Council would have broad reach
over the end-to-end process of identifying a virus, developing a
treatment, and distributing that treatment in a timely and equitable
fashion. It would also facilitate economic recovery and arbitrate
disputes arising out of the Council’s actions. This reach is necessary to
ensure a comprehensive response to global health events like
pandemics. The international community responded quickly to
COVID-19 in some ways, but in others, such as IP collaboration, it
lagged due to understandable bureaucratic roadblocks.177 The Council
must have the authority to engage parties like pharmaceutical
companies and national governments in meaningful dialogue with the
power to influence those discussions with incentives and guarantees.
These incentives would serve to establish licensing structures for
relevant intellectual property and later pave the way for raw resource
procurement at favorable rates so as to assist in expediting the
production of affordable treatments.
This Section will break down the Council’s powers over virus
identification, treatment, and dispute resolution. It will also cover
176
Other IGOs, like the International Medical Device Regulators Forum,
which supports the international regulation and distribution of critical devices like
ventilators and test kits, have situational relevance based on the crisis at hand. See
About IMDRF, INT’L MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATORS FORUM (last visited Apr. 20,
2022), https://www.imdrf.org/about [https://perma.cc/58U9-XTMD]. Therefore,
while these IGOs are not full members of the Council, liaising with them when their
field of expertise is relevant will allow the Council to efficiently leverage expertise
while remaining cost effective.
177 See supra II.A.2.b.

36

2022

The Post-Pandemic Order

10:2

funding models to support this initiative and address any risks or
concerns associated with the council’s structure and ability to carry out
its proposed responsibilities. As noted previously, many of the
Council’s members already carry out responsibilities similar to those
assigned forthwith.178 The purpose of the Council is to engage in a
concerted global response when a pandemic is identified. To that end,
where the Council’s responsibilities overlap with those of the
individual IGOs, the IGOs would work independently per their
mandate until a pandemic is identified. When that pandemic is
identified, the IGOs’ overlapping responsibilities would be subsumed
into the overarching imperatives of the Council.
1. Investigative Capabilities
First and foremost, among the Council’s powers would be the
ability to investigate emerging diseases and their origins. Tracking the
origin of a viral outbreak is critical to understanding it. By studying
where a virus came from, researchers are able to learn how it interacts
with other organisms and the environment around it, how it spreads,
and potentially even how it may be stopped or countered.179 In
particular, studying other host organisms to determine at what point
the virus becomes zoonotic (transmissible to humans) has provided
researchers a host of information, including potential avenues to
explore to develop antiviral treatments.180
Epidemiologists have also been able to use investigations of
existing pandemics to predict future ones, including COVID-19.
COVID-19 is the third zoonotic coronavirus to emerge in the 21st
century, following the SARS-CoV virus in 2003,181 and the MERS-CoV
virus in 2012.182 Scientists were able to predict the emergence of
See supra Part IV.A.1.
Qihui Wang et al., Tracing the Origins of SARS-CoV-2: Lessons Learned from
the Past, 21 CELL RES. 1139, 1139–40 (2021).
180 Id. at 1139–40.
181 CDC SARS Response Timeline, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/about/history/sars/timeline.htm (last visited
Nov 22. 2021).
182 Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV), WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.who.int/news-room/factsheets/detail/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-(mers-cov).
178
179
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COVID-19 as far back as 2016, when they collated data from the
previous two coronavirus outbreaks.183 Additionally, the data gathered
from the previous outbreaks provided a strong starting point when
researchers began studying COVID-19.184 The similarities between the
COVID-19, SARS-CoV, and MERS-CoV enabled those researchers
to access and leverage a wealth of data and epidemiological research
that jumpstarted therapeutic development and treatment.185 This
experience underscores the importance of allowing researchers timely
on-site access at emerging outbreak epicenters and logistical support
to conduct expansive field tests.
The COVID-19 pandemic drove this lesson home. When the
disease first appeared in Wuhan, WHO investigators flew to China but
were received coldly and granted only limited access.186 Although the
WHO publicly praised China’s cooperation with its investigators,
China withheld COVID-19’s genetic sequence for more than a week
after it had decoded it.187 China also delayed providing the WHO
access to critical disease transmission data within international
183
Shuo Su et al., Epidemiology, Genetic Recombination, and Pathogenesis of
Coronaviruses, 24 TRENDS IN MICROBIOLOGY 490, 490, 496, 499 (2016). See also Qihui
Wang et al., Tracing the Origins of SARS-CoV-2: Lessons Learned from the Past, 21 CELL
RSCH.1139, 1139 (2021) (“After the outbreaks of two zoonotic coronaviruses
(CoVs), severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and Middle
East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), researchers worldwide have
reached a consensus that the occurrence of the next CoV spillover event is only a
matter of time, as supported by research data and the natural laws of pathogen
emergence.”).
184
Yen-Der Li et al., Coronavirus Vaccine Development: From SARS and MERS
to
COVID-19,
27
J.
BIOMED.
SCI.
1,
1,
2
(2020),
https://jbiomedsci.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s12929-020-006952.pdf.
185 Id.
186
Jon Cohen, ‘The House was on Fire.’ Top Chinese Virologist on How China and
U.S. Have Met the Pandemic, SCIENCE INSIDER (May 22, 2020),
https://www.science.org/content/article/house-was-fire-top-chinese-virologisthow-china-and-us-have-met-pandemic [https://perma.cc/YW8B-JBMK]; see also
China has Rejected A WHO Plan for Further Investigation into the Origins of COVID-19,
NPR,
(Jul.
22,
2021),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2021/07/22/1019244601/china-who-coronavirus-lab-leak-theory.
187 China Delayed Releasing Coronavirus Info, Frustrating WHO, A.P. NEWS (Jun.
2, 2020, 2:04 PM), https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-health-ap-top-newsvirus-outbreak-public-health-3c061794970661042b18d5aeaaed9fae.
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statutory regulations and refused researchers access to Wuhan—
ground zero for the initial outbreak.188 Furthermore, the Chinese
government also censored doctors who attempted to share relevant
information and instead had officials declare over and over that the
COVID-19’s risk of transmission was low.189 In fact, the struggle to
properly investigate the origins of the virus continues even now. China
rejected multiple plans to study the origins of COVID-19 throughout
2020 and 2021,190 and in the instances where it allowed independent
researchers in, actively screened their access to data or withheld
relevant information altogether.191 These obstructionist behaviors
significantly hindered the WHO, and by extension the world’s ability
to understand and respond to the virus.192

Id. See also Donald G. McNeil Jr. & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, C.D.C. and
WHO Offers to Help China Have Been Ignored for Weeks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/health/cdc-coronavirus-china.html
(stating that although Chinese doctors stated a need for external assistance in early
2020, the Chinese government refused CDC and WHO assistance).
189 China Exonerates Doctor Reprimanded for Warning of Virus, A.P. NEWS (Mar.
19, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-accidents-ap-top-newsinternational-news-arrests-6f2e666485e9abae4bb112251eca77be. See also Nectar
Gan et al., Beijing Tightens Grip over Coronavirus Research, Amid US-China Row on Virus
Origin,
CNN
(last
updated
Apr.
16,
2020,
4:10
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/12/asia/china-coronavirus-research-restrictionsintl-hnk/index.html (noting that China imposed restrictions on the publication of
any academic research pertaining to the origin of COVID-19, actively censored
publications from leading research universities, including Fudan University and the
China University of Geoscience, and suppressing researchers who presented research
that contradicted the government’s narrative).
190 Coronavirus: China Rejects Call for Probe into Origins of Disease, BBC (Apr. 24,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-52420536; Associated Press,
China Has Rejected a WHO Plan for Further Investigation into the Origins of COVID-19,
NPR (Jul. 22, 2021, 9:44 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2021/07/22/1019244601/china-who-coronavirus-lab-leak-theory.
191
Javier C. Hernández & James Gorman, On W.H.O. Trip, China Refused to
Hand Over Important Data, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Jun. 16, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/12/world/asia/china-world-healthorganization-coronavirus.html; Covid: WHO Team Investigating Virus Origins Denied
Entry to China, BBC (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china55555466.
192
Stephanie Nebehay & John Miller, Data Withheld from WHO Team Probing
COVID-19 Origins in China: Tedros, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2021, 10:56 AM),
188
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As easy as it is to solely blame China for the communication
breakdown that set the WHO and other research divisions behind,
many other countries were slow to provide relevant data that would
have helped researchers combat COVID-19. The inability to identify
COVID-19 outbreaks and collect data on its transmissibility in
developing countries such as Iran and Brazil hindered epidemiologists’
attempts to grasp the scope of the pandemic.193 Even more recently,
insufficient testing and reporting in India during the summer of 2021
prevented scientists from seeing the full scope of the Delta variant’s
virulence.194
To resolve this issue, the Council would support existing
WHO pandemic investigation teams with gathering information at
emerging hotspots in two major ways. First, it would work directly with
hospitals and private healthcare partners to cut through the red tape
and allow researchers access to all existing and relevant data. To do
this it would be responsible for developing a standardized virus origin
study plan that is pre-approved by all UN member states. This plan
would be adaptable to different situations as the situation requires.
However, it would retain basic procedures and practices as well as a
predetermined set of data types that investigators would need, such as
accurate infection rates by geographic area. Pre-approval of access to
the most critical data would allow researchers to immediately begin
collating and analyzing information while local governments hash out

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-who-china-report/datawithheld-from-who-team-probing-covid-19-origins-in-china-tedrosidUSKBN2BM26S.
193
Maggie Michael, Doctors and Nurses Suffered as Iran Ignored Virus Concerns,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (May 12, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virusoutbreak-health-ap-top-news-international-news-iran6c7715f300797502329f6117e1141503; David Biller, In Bolsonaro’s Brazil, Everyone Else
is to Blame for the Virus, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (May 25, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-health-caribbean-ap-top-news-brazil7a7e8a0d3c524986412245ec9a23fad0.
194
Denise Chow, Where’s the Data on Delta? Lack of Testing, Info Makes it Hard
to See Virus’s Full Scope, NBC NEWS (Aug. 19, 2021, 7:44 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/delta-variant-responsehindered-covid-test-limitations-lack-data-rcna1692.
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a more detailed and virus specific action plan for the immediate
situation.
Second, if countries refuse to provide necessary information or
grant investigators access, the Council must have the ability to exert
economic and social pressures on them to compel cooperation. As
COVID-19 has proven, non-cooperation that leads to a delay in the
response to a virus can have drastic and lasting effects on the world as
a whole, regardless of where the virus originated. The Council would
have the power to put forward a sanctioning regime against
uncooperative countries. Ultimately the UN would have the final
decision on whether to apply the sanctioning regime, but by ensuring
that it receives expedited review, the Council can exert pressures that
hold countries accountable to the rest of the world for obstructionist
behavior.
Once the Council has sufficient data to properly analyze
emerging viral threats, it would then determine the severity of the
threat. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention identifies an
epidemic as “an increase, often sudden, in the number of cases of a
disease above what is normally expected in that population in that
area.”195 A pandemic emerges when multiple epidemics “occur over a
wide area and cross international boundaries to usually affect a large
number of people.”196 Because the proposed Council addresses global
threats, its role in addressing localized epidemics would be minimal
apart from continued monitoring and investigation. If or when an
epidemic becomes a pandemic, the Council’s additional responsibilities
of developing response plans would kick in.

195
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Epidemic Disease Occurrence,
Section of Lesson One: Introduction to Epidemiology, of Principles of
Epidemiology in Public Health Practice 3d ed., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION
1-1,
1-72
(May
2012),
https://www.cdc.gov/csels/dsepd/ss1978/SS1978.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HSPP68U].
196 Padmanabhan, supra note 24, at 111 (citing Pandemic, A DICTIONARY OF
EPIDEMIOLOGY 209 (Miguel Port et al. eds, 6th ed. 2014)).
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2. Voluntary and Non-Voluntary Licensing Capabilities
Assuming that the viral outbreak grows to pandemic
proportions, the Council’s next role would be to facilitate technology
transfer. As previously mentioned, slow or nonexistent technology
sharing hinders a rapid response to viral threats. Time and effort are
wasted because each pharmaceutical manufacturer must reinvent the
wheel and find their own way to make the cure. Much of that time and
money could be saved if manufacturers shared information and IP
early on to guide others away from formulas or methods that were
already proven unsuccessful. To be clear, however, this is not an
endorsement of free technology sharing. Free and unrestricted sharing
would provide little incentive for pharmaceutical companies to
innovate because the R&D costs alone would be prohibitive if there
were no guarantee of a return on investment.
The Council that this blueprint proposes would have the
power to facilitate voluntary and non-voluntary licenses. Voluntary
licenses are far more collaborative by nature and will be prioritized as
a way of sharing IP. Non-voluntary licenses would be a last resort and
would be treated as such.
a. Voluntary Licensing
Voluntary licensing should be the first approach to bring
pharmaceutical companies to the table to share their IP. It is
collaborative and far less adversarial than non-voluntary licensing. As
previously mentioned, voluntary licenses are a contract between the
pharmaceutical company and a licensee wherein the licensee
compensates the pharmaceutical company in return for access to the
IP.197 The Council can facilitate this process by working with state or
private licensees to provide sufficient incentives to encourage a
pharmaceutical company to license. Easing up on international loan
interest rates or international tariffs might provide tantalizing
incentives for manufacturers to enter a deal with the pharmaceuticals.
In exchange for helping the manufacturers enter a beneficial deal, the
manufacturers would have to assist the Council in deploying a

197

See supra Part II.A.b.
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percentage of the treatments to where the Council would deem fit.
This would likely end up being in a country in the global south that
lacks the infrastructure or capabilities to produce their own treatments.
On the other side, the Council would also negotiate with the
pharmaceutical companies and other IP rights-holders to encourage
them to enter contracts with the licensees. There too the Council has
a wide variety of levers to pull that might make the arrangement
palatable to licensors. By working with the global community to
guarantee favorable trading terms for vaccine components or
facilitating expedited (yet still thorough) clinical reviews of the finished
products, the Council can provide pharmaceutical companies a wealth
of support to increase their profits and decrease their costs. In
exchange for that support the pharmaceutical companies would also
commit to subsidizing and distributing a portion of their inventory to
developing nations. The WHO contingent of the Council can work
with existing vaccine delivery initiatives like the COVID-IP Pledge and
International Drug Purchase Facility to equitably deliver
pharmaceuticals to the global south.
b. Non-Voluntary Licensing
Although the Council should use voluntary licensing as the
primary method of facilitating IP sharing, it must also have the ability
to issue non-voluntary licenses if needed. Non-voluntary licenses are
licenses of an IP rights-holder’s IP without their consent.198 They have
little to no control over the terms of the lease, including who the
licensees are and how long the licenses are in effect.199 This lack of
control makes them highly unpalatable to rights holders and developed
IP regimes alike.
Despite that unpopularity, however, international treaties such
as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”) Agreement, provide statutory support for the use of nonMark W. Lauroesch, General Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States:
Good in Theory, But Not Necessary in Practice, 6 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 41, 41,
47 (1990).
199
Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The
Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 350–54 (1993).
198
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voluntary licenses in certain circumstances.200 Articles 8, 30, and 31
work in tandem to support a sovereign nation’s ability to issue nonvoluntary licenses and abridge patent rights to “adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition”201 provided they pay
adequate remuneration.202 Additionally, Article 31bis allows TRIPScompliant importing powers to countries without the infrastructure to
manufacture their own vaccines.203
Although there is a wealth of TRIPS provisions at the
international level, and at national level in individual nations’
intellectual property licensing regimes, non-voluntary licensing is
underused because of the countervailing interests at stake. Although
pharmaceutical companies often pay billions of dollars for research
and development, rigorous patent and trade secret protections on their
therapeutics allow them to reap the rewards when they charge higher
prices for their products.204 These companies are often loath to part
with their rights or allow others to develop alternative manufacturing
methods that might result in cheaper generic versions of their
pharmaceuticals. Developing nations favor compulsory licensing
regimes that give them access to generic drugs205 because they cannot
afford to license the patented intellectual property and their citizens
cannot afford the patented drug.

200
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex I.C., LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33
I.L.M.
81
(as
amended
on
Jan.
23,
2017),
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/31bis_trips_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K2YE-DQC3] [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
201 Id. art. 8.
202 Id. arts. 30, 31.
203 Id. art. 31bis.
204
Stanley Plotkin, Increasing Complexity of Vaccine Development, 212 J.
INFECTIOUS DISEASES S12, S12 (2015).
205 Generic Drug Facts, FOOD & DRUG AGENCY (Feb. 22, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/generic-drugs/generic-drug-facts
[https://perma.cc/32MJ-33C9] (defining a generic pharmaceutical as “a medication
created to be the same as an existing approved brand name-drug in dosage form,
safety, strength, route of administration, quality, and performance characteristics.”).
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The myriad of conflicting interests provides the perfect
incentive to grant an independent organization the power to issue nonvoluntary licenses during medical emergencies. The Council would
have control over international compulsory licensing regimes and their
implementation. The Council’s charter will give it the power to
implement compulsory licensing regimes on a case-by-case basis to
help regions that were unable to previously secure a voluntary license.
What would distinguish these regions from those that would normally
benefit from equitable vaccine distribution initiatives is manufacturing
capability. A nation could submit a request to the Council for an
emergency license if it has the ability to manufacture safe and reliable
treatments yet is unable to do so because (1) its native R&D initiatives
are struggling, and (2) manufacturers refuse to grant it licenses to
critical IP. The Council would review that request in context of the
surrounding circumstances and determine whether or not to use
TRIPS to compel IP sharing.
This approach to compulsory licensing leverages TRIPS
provisions for their intended use while mitigating the effects of a
significant hindrance to compulsory licensing: individual countries’
reluctance to abrogate IP rights. As previously mentioned, many
wealthy countries are reluctant to issue compulsory licensing
provisions because they supposedly run counter to their ideals as
capitalist economies.206 These countries even go so far as to openly
oppose other countries when they invoke compulsory licensing
provisions to deal with domestic health emergencies.207 This can result
in lengthy legal battles that stymie IP sharing and stagnate innovative
development.208 By allowing an international body to issue licenses,
much of the nation-specific agendas can be circumvented. The WHO

See supra Part III.C.2.
Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS
Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 941, 955–56 (2000)
(describing when the U.S. threatened trade sanctions against South Africa because it
issued compulsory licenses for AIDS medication).
208
Bayer Corp. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., Order No. 45/2013 (Intellectual
Property
Appellate
Board,
Chennai),
https://www.jetro.go.jp/ext_images/world/asia/in/ip/pdf/compulsory_IPAB_Fi
nal_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3K6-HDLC] (showing one example of a lengthy
legal battle over compulsory licensing provisions in a developing country).
206
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and WIPO are members of the Council, and can provide the
countervailing perspectives necessary for the whole Council to review
compulsory licensing requests holistically. If litigation were to still
ensue after a license was issued, the dispute resolution arm of the
Council would already have much of the material needed to resolve it
expeditiously.209
1. The Last Resort License
The Council’s charter should also include a contingency power
to be used if a situation were to emerge that voluntary licensing and
non-voluntary licensing could not address. In October 2020, India and
South Africa proposed a radical IP waiver that would waive all IP rights
until the end of the pandemic.210 Although that version failed to gain
traction, a revision in May that included a more definite sunset clause211
received more support—including from the United States.212 While it
remains to be seen whether the revised waiver will be adopted, the fact
remains that instituting blanket IP waivers for every future pandemic
will likely be untenable given the importance of IP rights to progress
and development.
That said, the Council should have a “break glass in case of
emergency” power to issue non-voluntary licenses for entire
geographical regions if they are still struggling to combat a pandemic
See infra Part IV.B.4.
Request for Waiver by India & South Africa, Waiver from Certain Provisions
of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID-19, WTO
Doc.
IP/C/W/669
(Oct.
2,
2020),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669.
pdf&Open=True [https://perma.cc/A6F3-Q57M] [hereinafter India/South Africa
Waiver].
211
Communication from the African Group et al., Waiver from Certain
Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID19,
WTO
Doc.
IP/C/669/Rev.1
(May
25,
2021),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669R
1.pdf&Open=True [https://perma.cc/BS9Y-DPSM] (setting the effective duration
of the waiver to three years, subject to an extension if necessary at that point).
212
Andrea Shalal et al., U.S. Reverses Stance, Backs Giving Poorer Countries access
to COVID Vaccine Patents, REUTERS (May 5, 2021, 2:10 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/biden-says-plansback-wto-waiver-vaccines-2021-05-05/ [https://perma.cc/385X-NNKL].
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even after voluntary and localized non-voluntary licenses have been
instituted. In a previous paper, we proposed a licensing structure based
on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) Article 5
Resolution.213 If a country were to bring a demand for a united defense
against a viral threat before the WHO, the WHO would, following a
majority vote in favor of such action, issue widespread non-voluntary
licenses to swiftly address the threat.214 This blueprint expands on that
proposal by giving the Council control over the beginning and end of
that process. The Council would bring the proposal for widespread
licensing provisions before the WHO. If the majority of the WHO’s
members vote in favor of compulsory licensing, the Council would
take over and issue the licenses and manage any disputes that arise.
The overarching goal is to provide the Council a variety of
options when it comes to licensing so that they can address different
situations with responses of commensurate weight. This will allow the
Council to respond efficiently in a manner that balances the rights of
IP rights-holders and the general population as equitably as possible.
3. Ability to Establish Rapid-Response Raw Material Pipelines
In addition to licensing to promote IP sharing, the Council
must also facilitate the next stage of pharmaceutical development:
manufacturing and production. Raw material procurement is one of
the most significant bottlenecks to both development and
production.215 Each vaccine requires raw materials that must be
sourced from around the world and purified in expensive processes.216
Supply chain breakdowns are significant hurdles that often severely
bottleneck the production process and overall response to viral threats
at inopportune times.217 This was especially evident during the
COVID-19 pandemic because the global supply chains for most
Padmanabhan, supra note 24, at 111.
Id.
215
Plotkin et al., supra note 156.
216 Id.
217
Costa Paris, Supply-Chain Obstacles Led to Last Month’s Cut to Pfizer’s Covid19 Vaccine-Rollout Target, WALL. ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2020, 6:58 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/pfizer-slashed-its-covid-19-vaccine-rollout-targetafter-facing-supply-chain-obstacles-11607027787
[https://perma.cc/LHE8ZDFN].
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industries were impacted in some way by various lockdowns.218 Further
complicating this issue is the desire of countries to hoard materials for
domestic production and use. Vaccine components and personal
protective equipment hoarding are an extension of vaccine nationalism
that has further strained the supply lines and available resources for a
unified global response.219
The Council would alleviate these trade pressures by building
the framework for flexible trade pipelines that go into effect when a
pandemic is identified. Free trade agreements like the North American
Free Trade Agreement reduce or eliminate barriers to trade and
investment between signatories.220 An analogous treaty between WHO
members that specifically covers healthcare related trade items and
only takes effect if a pandemic is identified would create a trade
corridor for those goods as soon as they are needed. Pre-negotiated
rates and trade systems will help healthcare product manufacturers
avoid some of the struggles that existing manufacturers are facing
during this pandemic: limited resources are only available at exorbitant
costs. The downstream effects of this improvement would of course
help pump more treatments out faster, thereby alleviating COVAX
and other vaccine distribution initiatives’ continuous struggle to
compete with wealthier entities for treatments.
Global trade of critical supplies might also be well served if the
trade agreement included a corollary that lays out a procedure for rapid
cargo transportation when the world locks down. The WHO and
UNICEF created a Supply and Logistics Guidance manual in February
2021 that lays out a procedure for shipment and delivery of both the
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(Oct.
18,
2021,
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Bhuma Shrivastava & Chris Kay, Vaccine Hoarding May Backfire on Rich
Nations as India Reels, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2021, 5:16 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-27/vaccine-hoarding-set-tobackfire-on-rich-nations-as-india-reels [https://perma.cc/Y5KK-5V9N].
220 See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), INT’L TRADE ADMIN.
(Jul. 1, 2020), https://www.trade.gov/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta
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vaccine components and finished product.221 It lays out guidance for
how to prepare for and execute a vaccination campaign as well as how
to maintain logistic supply trains during tumultuous viral events.222
Standardizing those recommendations and supporting the
infrastructure ahead of a pandemic will help when countries begin
restricting movement, trade, and transportation.
To further alleviate trade pressures and streamline distribution,
the Council would use its trade initiatives to also streamline regulatory
approval. As previously mentioned, regulatory approval bottlenecks
pharmaceutical production and distribution.223 Regulatory agencies,
like the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), conduct redundant
and wasteful trials all over the world instead of collaborating and
sharing data.224 Not only does this result in profligate waste of
resources, but also of time.225 However, as of late, regulatory agencies
have been looking for ways to share data. Examples of data sharing
using large scale real-world data (“RWD”), already exist in Japan,
Europe, and the U.S.226 And, as the FDA increasingly trusts RWD
when making regulatory approval decisions,227 RWD sharing has
become increasingly important. By facilitating regulatory approval
testing data sharing between different agencies, including the FDA and

See generally COVID-19 Vaccination: Supply and Logistics Guidance, WHO &
UNICEF
(Feb.
12,
2021),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/339561/WHO-2019-nCoVvaccine_deployment-logistics-2021.1-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5WL-BFVS].
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223 See supra Part II.A.1.
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those in the European regulatory system,228 the Council would be able
to expedite review and approval for key drugs when they are needed.
Fortunately, the infrastructure needed to share investigatory data229 and
intellectual property230 can be used to effectuate this initiative.
4. Dispute Resolution
The Council’s final responsibility would be dispute resolution.
As previously mentioned, some of the Council’s actions might spur
legal claims. The issuance of a non-voluntary license, for example,
might invite a claim of expropriation from a foreign pharmaceutical
company whose patent is licensed and R&D investment is destroyed.
The Bayer v. Natco case is an example of the sort of dispute that slows
down the response to a pandemic.231 Tedious court proceedings and
injunctions thwart the imperative for a rapid response.
The Council will be empowered to adjudicate some of these
claims and prevent others. A successful dispute resolution institution
already exists that can serve as a model to emulate: ICSID.232 Partially
funded by the World Bank Group, ICSID specializes in addressing and
resolving investment related disputes around the world.233 Teams of
trained international investment legal experts are assigned to each
ICSID case to provide fact-finding and procedural assistance.234 An
The European Regulatory System for Medicines: A Consistent Approach to
Medicines Regulation Across the European Union, EUR. MEDICINES AGENCY at 2 (2016),
https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/leaflet/european-regulatory-systemmedicines-european-medicines-agency-consistent-approach-medicines_en.pdf
(“The European medicines regulatory system is based on a network of around 50
regulatory authorities from the 31 EEA countries (28 EU Member States plus
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), the European Commission and EMA.”).
229 See supra Part IV.B.1.
230 See supra Part IV.B.2.
231
Bayer Corp. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., Order No. 45/2013 (Intellectual
Property
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Board,
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https://www.jetro.go.jp/ext_images/world/asia/in/ip/pdf/compulsory_IPAB_Fi
nal_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3K6-HDLC].
232 See supra Part IV.A.1.
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https://icsid.worldbank.org/About/ICSID (last visited Nov. 30, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/RR2X-2L6B].
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independent Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal then hears
evidence and legal arguments from both sides before rendering a
binding award.235 This impartial and thorough process has inspired
confidence in financial entities worldwide and has allowed ICSID to
manage and deliver awards in over 700 arbitrations.236 In terms of
prevention, the World Bank could work through ICSID to try to
exclude Council efforts from the treaties that might give rise to
expropriation or Fair and Equitable Treatment claims.
The Council could go one step further and create its own
arbitral body, comparable to ICSID, capable of hearing claims and
rendering awards in disputes related to the activities of the Council.
The value of ICSID comes from its reputation for providing impartial
and specialized support throughout the arbitration process.237 Forum
shopping is not a new concept. The practice of arbitral institutions
tailoring their adjudicative expertise and administrative procedures to
appeal to a niche of the legal community is tried and tested.238 Federal
judges in the Eastern and Western Districts of Texas in the United
States famously tailored their courts to be patent litigation friendly by
becoming experts on patent law, developing efficient and speedy
administrative procedures for patent cases, and adopting beneficial
local rules.239 Although this led to the U.S. Supreme Court adopting a
ruling in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Group Brands LLC,240 that
virtually prohibited forum shopping, the theory is still sound and can
be applied to the current issue.
If the Council were to develop a dispute resolution forum like
ICSID that supported international parties in pandemic healthcare and
licensing claims, it would likely be able to create an appealing forum
for those disputes. The Council’s composition coalesces experts in
Id.
Id.
237
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international healthcare, trade, intellectual property, and finance in one
area. Problematic legal disputes that would hinder the Council’s
mission would have legal issues that touch on most, if not all of those
specialties. Parties to those disputes who use the Council’s dispute
resolution system would not only benefit from experienced support on
those matters, but also from a guaranteed fast-tracked resolution. The
Council would expedite review of claims that affected their mission.
Additionally, because the Council would lead the initiatives that are
being challenged, its experts would already be well-versed in the
rationale of those initiatives and have a deep understanding of the
situation. Although they would not actively participate in the dispute
resolution decision making, they could provide insight and data that
would quickly bring the arbitrators or mediators up to speed.
The overarching goal is to develop a trusted dispute resolution
system with expertise in the legal issues surrounding pandemic
healthcare. By working to impartially assist aggrieved parties that are
unhappy with the Council’s actions, the dispute resolution system
would rapidly target and address legal threats that could stymie a united
global pandemic response.
C. Proposed Funding Model for Initiatives through Taxes
Finding funding to enable the Council and its initiatives will be
one of the most challenging aspects to this proposal. As previously
mentioned, IGOs like the WHO are woefully underfunded.241
Voluntary contributions would likely be insufficient. The Council
would therefore have to rely on other means of financial support. An
obvious solution would be to fold it into another budget wherein
countries would support it through their annual assessed contributions
to the UN or WHO. That, however, would unlock a host of other
issues and problems that are too numerous to be addressed here.
A potential solution lies in UNITAID’s response to other
global diseases. The airline ticket tax UNITAID uses to fund delivery
of malaria, HIV, and tuberculosis relies on countries taxing a mode of
transportation to fund an international healthcare initiative.242 This
241
242
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model can be adapted to fit a variety of other industries. Tourism and
travel were two industries that were hit particularly hard by COVID19.243 The United Nations World Tourism Organization (“UNWTO”)
reported an estimated global loss of $1.3 trillion in export revenues
stemming from the collapse of international travel.244 Between 2019
and 2020, global international travel declined by 73%.245 This loss was
also felt in industries that intersect tourism and travel. The cruise
industry in the United States contributed $55 billion to the American
economy in 2019.246 In 2020, it lost $32 billion.247
The survival of international tourism and travel is tied to the
swift resolution of global viral events. Leveraging that need to institute
national tourism taxes and cruise ticket taxes would be analogous to
taxing international airline travel. And like the airline ticket tax, the
tourism and cruise ticket taxes would go directly into funding Council
initiatives that prevent prolonged pandemics that have the potential to
hamstring the global economy.

Secretary-General’s Policy Brief on Tourism and COVID-19, UN WORLD
TOURISM ORG., https://www.unwto.org/tourism-and-covid-19-unprecedentedeconomic-impacts (last visited Nov. 30, 2021), [https://perma.cc/2KUN-H39L];
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BUREAU (Jun. 23, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/06/initialimpact-of-covid-19-on-travel-tourism-outdoor-recreation-varied-widely-acrossstates.html [https://perma.cc/D7LM-3CHT]; 2020: Worst Year in Tourism History with
1 Billion Fewer International Arrivals, UN WORLD TOURISM ORG. (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://webunwto.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2021-01/210128barometer-en.pdf?GaI1QTYG.Ky9LDZ2tlDKc.iRZkinJeuH
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Starting first with the global cruise line tax, its structure would
mimic the airline tax248 in that it would be a domestic tax that would
be determined by countries that choose to participate, with
proceedings earmarked for use to fund the Council. From 2006 to
2011, the tax incomes from a handful of countries constituted 80% of
UNITAID’s funding.249 With global support, the cruise industry would
be able to offer the Council significant financial assistance if countries
were to tax cruise tickets for cruises leaving their ports.
The tourism tax would be more complex. Tourism is an
umbrella term for activities and services offered to individuals outside
of the home environment.250 Those services generally include local
transportation, accommodation (such as hotels and inns), and ancillary
services (such as shopping centers, facilities, entertainment, activities
and attractions).251 For taxing purposes, each nation’s tax would be
proportional to its tourism revenue. Nations would also independently
set the tax rates for each service sector. The combined taxes from the
service sectors would be rolled into the tourism tax revenue that the
country would allocate to the Council.
Together, the tourism tax and the travel tax will help countries
support the Council’s initiatives and allow it to operate with funding
commensurate with the scope of its responsibilities.
D. Risks and Concerns
Risks are inherent whenever suggesting sweeping changes like
forming a new intergovernmental agency. Sovereign states enjoy their
autonomy and would certainly hesitate to cede autonomy over
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https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/bitstream/123456789/21436/5/The%20Tou
rism%20Industry%20-%20An%20Overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NWF7XUHV].
251 Id. at 7, 12, 16.
248

54

2022

The Post-Pandemic Order

10:2

property rights to an external power. While this paper is unable to
address all of the risks associated with forming a new IGO, it can
discuss the largest one: a lack of national support for participation in
the Council’s initiatives. The concern is that the citizenry would not
agree to grant power to the Council even if their countries’ political
leaders supported it. The economic insecurity caused by COVID-19
has led to widespread distrust of political institutions and political
leaders.252 The politicization of COVID-19 issues has further divided
many countries’ citizens and has affected their views on how their
leaders are handling the pandemic.253 This is problematic because even
if healthcare officials see the need for the Council, political leaders who
do not have their base’s support and are seeking reelection would not
support the initiative.
Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to this issue. It is very
likely that no country would have supported forming the Council
before 2020 because none would have seen the need. Since then,
however, the world has had to endure lockdown after lockdown, and
stifled economic growth for over two years. With new variants
emerging regularly—like the Omicron variant that appeared in
November 2021 and is more transmissible than any previous
variant,254—there is no end in sight for COVID-19.255 Although public
trust in political institutions has decreased, increased education and
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pandemic exhaustion have pushed society towards cooperation in
many areas that were previously not possible. Over the past year, more
than seventy countries have united to call for a comprehensive
pandemic treaty.256 Despite numerous delays, including lockdowns in
response to the Omicron variant, the WHA officially agreed to begin
the treaty drafting process.257 The first two meetings of the WHA’s
intergovernmental negotiating body (“INB”) are set for March 1, 2022,
and August 1, 2022.258 The INB is expected to have a completed draft
ready for consideration at the 77th World Health Assembly in 2024.259
The continued push for sweeping pandemic response reform
allays many concerns that the erosion of trust in political institutions
will result in national governments being unwilling to act. While it is
far too early to celebrate, a renewed spirit of cooperation is prevalent
that bodes well for support for IGOs like the Council that can facilitate
and enable a unified global pandemic response.
V. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic has changed everything. In its wake,
any effort to restore an inadequate status quo is misguided. When it
comes to pandemic prevention and response, the world cannot and
should not go home again. The continuing threat of COVID-19
variants drives home the importance of creating a comprehensive
global pandemic framework to address not just the emerging diseases
of the future, but the continuing diseases of the present.

Stephanie Nebehay, WHO Nears Consensus on Future International Pact to
Prevent Pandemics – Diplomat, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2021, 5:20 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/who-nearsconsensus-future-international-pact-prevent-pandemics-diplomats-2021-11-26/
[https://perma.cc/84ZE-TBQH].
257 World Health Assembly Agrees to Launch Process to Develop Historic Global
Accord on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Dec. 1,
2021),
https://www.who.int/news/item/01-12-2021-world-health-assemblyagrees-to-launch-process-to-develop-historic-global-accord-on-pandemicprevention-preparedness-and-response [https://perma.cc/RM8Y-NRVR].
258 Id.
259 Id.
256

56

2022

The Post-Pandemic Order

10:2

Past frameworks and attempted solutions were the products of
tensely-negotiated compromises between IP holders, public health
organizations, and national governments, with assistance from trade
and financial organizations. While many were inventive and narrowly
effective, all suffered from defects such that the entire network of
solutions in place in 2019 failed to predict or slow, let alone stop, the
COVID-19 pandemic. Rather than slotting one more narrowlytailored solution into the expected place, leaving room for the next
pandemic to surprise the world, leaders ought to cast a wider net and
create a more robust program. Now is not the time to stop leaks with
a finger. It is time to reimagine the entire dike.
A multilateral pandemic council offers the chance to create a
robust program to neutralize future viral threats. By controlling the
end-to-end process of threat investigation, technology licensing, and
treatment production, the Council would be able to synchronize
different processes and systems to develop a unified response. Though
it may seem cumbersome to include so many IGOs, wide
representation ensures that the Council’s actions will be thoughtful and
durable. It promotes buy-in from key stakeholders whose voices went
unheard in previous frameworks. Health interests can be balanced
against IP interests and financial interests. This method ensures that all
voices are heard before decisions are rendered. By building a spirit of
cooperation, the blueprint builds on an understanding of trust and
shared growth that will ensure its longevity. It promises a more
equitable, effective, and sustainable solution than what has come
before.
Admittedly, there are tremendous obstacles in the way of
organizing the council as it is proposed here. Building international
consensus around anything, even the imperative of stopping a
pandemic, is almost impossible. The IGOs proposed as members of
the Council face their own challenges and headwinds that could make
cooperation and consolidation at the level proposed by this blueprint
difficult. Conventional wisdom dictates that any ambitious project of
international governance is doomed to irrelevance, if not stillbirth. But
conventional wisdom also dictated that viral pandemics were a thing
of the past, that science had triumphed over disease in the western
world, and that the status quo was safe. We present this blueprint not
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as an easy solution, or even a readily practical one, but as an
extraordinary one called for by extraordinary circumstances. The
proposal is as serious as the threat of the next global pandemic.
The COVID-19 pandemic has forced humanity to realize that
“home” has never been an island of seclusion. Pandemics render
insularism and nationalism impractical. Every time a new contagious
disease emerges somewhere in the world, the entire global community
is at risk. Only by working together can we thwart global pandemics
and the isolation and desolation that they bring. COVID-19 is not the
first viral threat to test the world, and it will not be the last. The
implementation of a Multilateral Council on Pandemic Response as
described above can ensure the world is ready for the next one.
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